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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[50 C.2d 75; 323 P.2d 397] 
[Crim. No. 6127. In Bank. Mar. 26, 1958.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MAX OSSLO et al., 
Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.-An ap-
pellate court will not determine the weight of the evidence, but 
will decide only whether on the face of the evidence it can be 
held that sufficient facts could not have been found by the 
jury to warrant the inference of guilt. 
[2] Assault-Evidence.-A jury determination that all of the 
members of a sailors' union hired by a butchers' union to act 
as "observers" during its labor dispute with a clerks' union 
participated in an assault and battery on two clerks was sup-
ported by evidence that the sailors, on being informed that 
the clerks were in a certain market, surrounded them, stomped 
on their feet, and, after one of the clerks got away, made an 
unprovoked assault on the other clerk. 
[3] Id.-Review.-Resolution of conflicting evidence as to whether 
certain defendants participated in an assault is for the trier 
of fact, not for a reviewing court. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 1309; [2, 6] Assault, 
§ 8; [3, 8, 11] Assault, § 13; [4] Criminal Law, § 389(3); [5] 
Conspiracy, § 23; [7] Assault, § 7; [9, 10] Conspiracy, § 19; [12] 
Conspiracy,§ 5; [13, 17, 18, 26] Criminal Law,§ 1404; [14] Jury, 
§ 103(1); [15) Criminal Law, § 1388; [16] Crimina: Law, § 1404 
(5); [19, 20, 24] Criminal Law, § 1404(6); [21] Criminal Law, 
§ 1407; [22, 23] Criminal Law,§ 1407(3); [25, 28] Criminal Law, 
§ 1404(12); [27] Criminal Law,§ 1407(9); (29, 31] Criminal Law, 
§ 990; [30) Criminal Law, § 991; [32] Judges, § 21; [33] Criminal 
Law, §§ 237, 250. 
( 75) 
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[ 4] Criminal Law- Evidence- Facts Showing Consciousness of 
Guilt.-False statements of defendants, made through deliber-
ate and willful intent, concerning matters within their own 
knowledge and relating materially to the issue of their guilt 
or innocence of the offenses of which they were convicted, 
cogently evidenced consciousness of guilt, suggested that there 
was no honest explanation for incriminating circumstances, 
and thus were admissions of guilt. 
[5] Conspiracy-Criminal-Evidence.-A conspiracy can generally 
be established only by circumstantial evidence, since it is not 
often that the direct fact of a common unlawful design can 
be proved other than by establishment of independent facts 
bearing on such design. 
[6] Assault-Evidence.-From evidence that defendants, who were 
representatives of a butchers' union involved in a labor dispute 
with a clerks' union and who had been actively and extensively 
engaged in union affairs, hired members of a sailors' union, 
other members of which had participated in labor disputes to 
which the sailors' union was not a party and had committed 
an assault and battery in connection with one such dispute, 
and from the size and build and appearance of those members 
of the sailors' union who were employed, from the fact that 
such sailors were not familiar with the locations of various 
foods in the markets or with the terms of the butchers' con-
tracts but wt>re assertedly employed to act as "observers" to 
ascertain whetht>r clerks were handling packaged foods which 
the butchers claimed should be handled by the latter and that 
the sailors were paid at a higher rate of compensation than 
members of the butchers' union, it was a reasonable inference 
that defendants anticipated and agreed that the sailors would 
initiate violence against the clerks. 
[7] Id.-Evidence.-Evidence that members of a sailors' union, 
hired by representatives of a butchers' union to act as "ob-
servers" of a clerks' union with which it was involved in a 
labor dispute, participated in other labor disputes to which 
the sailors' union was not a party and that other members of 
the union were guilty of assault and battery in connection with 
their participation in such disputes, was properly admitted 
as tending to show that representatives of the butchers' union 
contemplated that the employment of the sailors probably 
would result in acts of violence by the sailors. 
[8] Id.- Review- Harmless Error.- Evidence concerning fights 
unconnected with union activities involving some members of 
a sailors' union, hired by representatives of a butchers' union 
to act as "observers" of a clerks' union with which it was 
involved iu a labor dispute, was not admissible as tending 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, § 30; Am.Jur., Conspiracy, § 38. 
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to show that those persons were hired with the expectation 
that they would commit assaults connected with union ac-
tivity, but error in admitting wch evidcnee did not mislead 
the jury where there was ample evidence to show that such 
persons participated in the assault and battery in f[Uestion. 
Conspiracy-Criminal-Evidence.-Evidence in a conspiracy 
case of many telephone calls between defendants and other 
members of their organizations was properly received to show 
defendants' association; that such association was criminal 
was shown by other evidence, viewed as a whole. 
Id.-Criminal-Evidence.-Testimony of a police officer con-
cerning the arrest and release of certain members of a clerks' 
union, after an assault on other clerks of which representatives 
of a butchers' union and members of a sailors' union hired by 
them were convicted, was admissible as tending to show that 
an officer of the butchers' union, after tlw assault, attempted 
to harass the clerks' union by unsubstantiated accusations and 
to distract emphasis from the charg·es against him by counter-
charges, and as tending to show that sueh officer was a con-
spirator carrying on an effort to make good his declaration 
that he "was boss of the \Vest Coast and he would fight for 
jurisdiction." 
[11] Assault-Review--Harmless Error.-A busirwss agent for a 
butchers' union should have been permitted to testify on cross-
examination by the defense that on a certain date a represen-
tative of the union reported to him and a certain officer of the 
union that he had been frightened ut a market by members 
of the clerks' union, with which the butcher~' u11ion was in-
volved in a labor dispute, since sueh testimony was relevant 
to the purpose of employment of members of a sailors' union 
by representatives of the butchers' union as '"observers" of 
activities of the clerks' union, but in the light of the entire 
record the exclusion of such testimony did not prejudice the 
members of the butchers' union or the sailors employed by 
them. 
[12] Conspiracy-Criminal-Particular Conspiraeies.-A conspira-
cy to commit a misdemeanor assault is a crime within the 
purview of Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 1, providing for punish-
ment for conspiracy to commit any crime. 
[13] Criminal Law- Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-Defendants were not prejudiced by a 
press release of the prosecuting attorney published before trial 
that they were attempting to delay trial, though they were 
merely objecting, as they had a right to do, to the procedure 
of having a jury selected by one judge and the actual trial 
conducted by another judge, where the trial judge, in accord 
with the request of defendants' counsel, specifically admon-
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ished the jurors to pay no attention to the newspaper state-
ment and generally admonished them to pay no attention to 
new spa per articles. 
[14] Jury-Voir Dire Examination-Scope of Inquiry.-It was not 
improper for the prosecuting attorney in an assault and con-
spiracy ease involving members of labor unions to ask pros-
p!~ctive jurors sueh questions as "You don't believe that might 
makes right j?" "And do you feel that a person, because he is 
a member of a labor union, deserves to get beat up once in 
a while'/" and ''You wouldn't permit sympathy or the feeling 
to 'let's give him another chance' to influence your decision in 
this matter 7"; such questions were designed to elicit relevant 
information concerning prospective jurors' states of mind. 
[15] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Jury.-A question 
asked prospective jurors in an assault and conspiracy case 
involving members of labor unions, "You know a clerk was 
beaten?" was not improper and could not be prejudicial, where 
the fact was indubitably established and it concerned the 
subject of the assault charge. 
[16] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-Defendants in an assault and conspiracy case were 
not prejudiced by the prosecuting attorney's opening statement 
that one defendant was a member of the grand jury that re-
turned the indictment, where defense counsel, in moving to 
strike the statement, said "everybody knows that." 
[17] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-Defcndants in an assault and conspiracy case in-
volving one defendant who had been secretary-treasurer of a 
butchers' union were not prejudiced by the prosecuting attor-
ney's statement concerning the secretary-treasurer of another 
butchers' union being "worried about [defendant J and worried 
about goons," where evidence concerning this matter was sub-
sequently excluded; this and other references to "goons" by 
the prosecuting attorney were no more improper, in the light 
of the evidence developed by the prosecution, than would be 
a reference to "thieves" in a larceny prosecution. 
[18] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-\Vhere the trial judge in an assault and conspiracy 
case in the course of his preliminary instruction commenced 
to read an instruction concerning assault with a deadly weap-
on whieh the prosecuting attorney had incorrectly included in 
his requested instructions, then stopped reading and asked 
the prosecuting attorney if it was his contention that a deadly 
weapon was used, to which the attorney answered, "No. By 
means of force," but then said, "A prize fighter is a weapon~" 
this remark or query was improper, as was the request for an 
Mar. 1958] PEOPLE v. OssLo 
[50 C.2d 75; 323 P.2d 397] 
79 
instruction concerning assault with a deadly weapon, but th(' 
incidents, not persisted in before the jury, were not prejudicial. 
[19] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-Defendants in an assault and conspiracy case were 
not prejudiced by the prosecution's act in bringing into the 
courtroom a board on which were pictures referred to by 
counsel as "rogue's gallery" photographs of defendants, assum-
ing that the jury saw the photographs which the court declined 
to permit in evidence, where the jury were clearly and re-
peatedly instructed that they must determine the facts from 
the evidence produced in court and must not consider any 
offer of evidence that was rejected by the court. 
[20] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-Defendants in an assault and conspiraey case in-
volving labor unions were not prejudiced by questions of the 
prosecution to which objection was made and sustained, 
whether a named labor leader supplied "strong ann men" for 
use in labor disputes where, in a pretrial statement of one 
defendant in connection with his motion to quash the indict-
ment, it was admitted that defendant "turned to [the labor 
leader] for help" and that such procedure in hlbor circles was 
not considered unusual. 
[21] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-\Vhere a witness in an assault and conspiracy case 
testified that a person whom she had seen at the time of the 
assault "is the second gentleman," indicating a certain defend-
ant, whereupon the prosecuting attorney said, "I object to the 
use of the word 'gentleman,'" the judge's prompt action in 
rebuking the prosecuting attorney and admonishing the jury 
to disregard his remark was sufficient to cure any harm that 
might have resulted. 
(22] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-\Vhere a poliee officer in an assault and conspiracy 
case involving labor unions testified that he saw two members 
of a sailor's union in the office of an oftieer of a butchers' 
union and that "I didn't like a couple of big, husky men 
walking around as bodyguards and gave the appearance of 
being toughs of the worst sort," whereupon the prosecuting 
attorney asked, "As a matter of fact, if you hadn't seen 
them in [that] office you would have run them out of town," 
this improper question was not prejudicial, in view of the 
judge's rebuke of the prosecuting attorney, and of the facts 
that the jurors had ample opportunity to determine from per-
sona.! observation whether the sailors WPre "hig, husky men," 
and were admonished thnt th1~y must dP<·ide the isf;nes on the 
evidenc(' bPfore th(•Jll, not on remarko of: counsel. 
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[23] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-·where the prosecuting attorney in an assault and 
conspiracy case involving members of labor unions asked one 
defendant, who was testifying, "As a matter of fact, any time 
[a named labor leader J gets in any type of dispute that he is 
out for a jurisdictional grab it is the old Communist slogan 
he uses ... ," whereupon defense counsel interrupted with an 
objection and the trial judge sustained the objection and di-
rected the jury to "disregard it," the interrupted, improper 
question was not prejudicial. 
[24] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-\Vhere defense counsel twice objected to the prose-
cuting attorney's "yelling" at one defendant while such de-
fendant was being cross-examined, and on each occasion the 
trial judge replied that the prosecuting attorney could use any 
tone of voice he wished, such ruling could not be determined 
to be either erroneous or prejudicial in the absence of a show-
ing that the asserted "yelling" intimidated the witness or 
harmed defendants. 
[25] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-\Vhere the prosecuting attorney in closing argu-
ment in an assault case involving members of labor unions 
referred to a case in which "a man died in the gas chamber" 
because of a battery, assertedly similar to that involved in the 
instant case, and ·where the judge promptly admonished the 
prosecuting attorney to "confine yourself to this case," de-
fendants were not harmed. 
[26] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-In an assault and conspiracy case involving mem-
bers of certain labor unions, the prosecuting attorney's refer-
ence to a noted labor leader and to a business agent of de-
fendant butchers' union as "unindicted co-conspirators," 
though unfair to them in the sense that they were not before 
the court and thus not in a position to answer the charge, was 
not prejudicial to defendants where the reference suggested 
the tenable view of the evidence taken by the prosecuting 
attorney and presumptively taken by the jury. 
[27] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-ln an assault and conspiracy case involving mem-
bers of certain labor unions, any prejudicial effect of the 
prosecuting attorney's statement in argument that a desig-
nated defendant was "the finger man," concerning which there 
was no evidence, was corrected by the trial judge's prompt 
admonition that ''The jury will remember the evidence .... 
[I J f the evidence isn't there the inference isn't there and they 
will disregard it." 
1958] PEoPLE v. OssLo 
[50 C.2d 75; 323 P.2d 397] 
81 
!d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-In an assault and conspiracy case involving mem-
bers of certain labor unions, the prosecuting attorney's state-
ments in argument that a named labor leader was a "bed 
fellow" of another named labor leader and that "It is two per 
cent his [the first named labor leader's] fight against Com-
munism and ninety eight per cent his for jurisdictional 
power," were not prejudicial where the statements were made 
in reply to defense counsel's argument that the sailors' union, 
to which some of the defendants belonged, "was the only thing 
that stood between complete Communist control of the :Mari-
time industry and [the labor leader first named] personally 
was responsible for that on every occasion." 
[29] Id.-Probation-Conditions.-In an assault and conspiracy 
case involving members of certain labor unions, the conditions 
of probation granted those defendants who were members of 
a butchers' union did not exceed the trial judge's power by 
reason of the provision that such defendants should not, during 
a 10-year probationary period, hold any union position or 
receive remuneration from any union, where it could he and 
presumptively was found that those defendants were guilty of 
crimes growing out of union activities. 
[30] !d.-Probation-Discretion of Court.-'rhe grant of probation 
is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court; a 
defendant has no right to probation, bnt he has the right, if 
he feels that the terms of probation are more harsh than the 
sentence imposed by law, to refuse probation and undergo the 
sentence. 
[31] Id.-Probation-Conditions.-The trial judge does not have 
power to impose in his probation orders the terms "that this 
Court and Judge shall retain jurisdiction of this matter 
throughout the ... period of probation and no other depart-
ment of the Court or other Judge shall modify this order 
without notice to the Judge who tried the case"; the cause is 
before the eonrt, not the individual judge, and the jurisdiction 
which the judge exercises is the jurisdiction of the court, not 
of the judge. 
[32] Judges-Powers and Duties.-Rnles of court providing that 
post-trial proceedings in a cause shall be heard by the judge 
who tried the matter are proper, hut the individual judge can-
not order that such procPedings must be heard by him. 
[33] Criminal Law-Time of Trial and Postponement.-The con-
tinuance of a criminal case after the date set for trial when 
civil cases were being tried in other departments did not 
violate Pen. Code, §§ 68la ("The welfare of the people ... 
[29] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments,§ 357. 
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requires that all proceeding~ in criminal cases shall be heard 
and determined at the earliest possible time"), 1050 ("Crimi-
nal cases shall be given precedence over all civil matters and 
proceedings"), where the continuance to enable trial to be held 
in a certain department was not made for the purpose of im-
properly channeling the case into that department, but the 
orderly administration of a crowded calendar required the 
continuance to enable trial of the case in the proper depart-
ment; the precedence to which criminal eases are entitled is 
not of such an absolute and overriding eharaeter that the 
system of having separate departments for eivil and eriminal 
matters must be abandoned. 
APPEAI1S from judgments of: the Superior Court of San 
Diego County and from orders de11ying a new trial and grant-
ing probation. John A. IIewieker, Judge. ,Judgments and 
order denying new trial affirmed; orders granting probation, 
modified and affirmed. 
Prosecution for conspiracy to commit assault and for m;sault 
by means of force likely to prodme great bodily injury. 
Judgments of conviction affirmed. 
Aaron Sapiro, Charles M. Arak and Charles P. Scully for 
Appellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Korman H. 
Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondrnt. 
SCHAUER, J.-Defendants were charged with (count I) 
"Conspiracy to Commit the Crime of Assault (PC 182)" 
and (count U) ''Assault by Means of Force Likely to Pro-
duce Great Bodily Injury (PC 245)." A jury found them 
guilty as charged. Imposition of sc•ntenee upon defendants 
Osslo, McFaden, and Meyer was suspended and they were 
granted probation. ,Judgments of conviction were entered 
against defendants Hazel, Caeio, Dempster, Dimitratos, and 
Tueker. Defendants' motion for new trial was denied. De-
fendants appeal, respectivdy, from the probation orders and 
judgments, and from the order denying their motion for 
new trial. They present a multifold attaek upon the orders 
and judgments. Dt>fPndants urg(' that the Pvideiwe is in-
suffieient.; that tllrre was prejndieial error in the admission 
and Pxelusion of evidPIWP; 1 hat the eharge of eons piracy to 
commit the erime of assault is not a (·harge of a c1·irne known 
to the laws of this state; that there was prejudicial mis-
l\far.1958] PEOPLE v. OssLo 
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conduct of the prosecuting attorney; that the punishment 
imposed upon defendants Osslo, MeFaden and 1\feyer is im-
proper and excessive; and that the ease was erroneously 
channeled into a particular department of the superior court. 
For the reasons developed in the ensuing discussion we have 
concluded that these contentions are without substantial merit 
except that one of the terms, hereinafter described, of the 
orders granting probation to Osslo, MeFaden, and Meyer is 
erroneous, and that the orders should be modified by striking 
out the erroneous provision. 
The conduct and incidents involved in this prosecution 
arose out of a jurisdictional dispute in San Diego County 
between the local Butchers' Union and the local Retail 
Clerks' Union. Preceding this dispute members of the Clerks' 
Union employed in markets which stocked frozen and pack-
aged dinners had handled the sale of such dinners. The 
Butchers' Union determined that its members rather than 
members of the Clerks' Union should have the handling of 
the frozen dinners which included a meat or poultry serv-
ing, and demanded that the markets govern their employes 
accordingly. The Butchers claimed "violation of contract" 
by the markets permitting Clerks to continue handling the 
dinner items and called a strike at one of the markets. 
The Clerks endeavored to have the dispute settled through 
legal proceedings. About October 5, 1955, the secretary-
treasurer of the Clerks' local wrote ''to the market operators 
informing them of the jurisdictional dispute and the stand 
the Clerks were taking." Representatives of the Butchers 
and the Clerks met a few days prior to October 12 (according 
to one witness, prior to October 8). The secretary-treasurer 
of the Clerks' local "made demand upon Mr. Osslo [who 
held various offices, hereinafter detailed, with the Butchers] 
to cause to have the merchandise in dispute at Ferguson's 
market, as an example, placed back under the jurisdiction 
of the Clerks, or our organization would take every legal 
means necessary to t>nforce the jurisdiction." (Italics added.) 
Osslo ''pounded the table three times, stated he was boss 
of the \Vest Coast and he would fight for jurisdiction.'' 
On October 18, 1955, four days before the assault of which 
defendants stand convictt>d, the Clerks filed with the National 
Labor Relations Board a petition "for the purpose of having 
the Board determine who the jurisdiction belonged to." 
In contrast to the efforts of the Clerks to settle the con-
troversy by legal proceedings, and inferentially to carry out 
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the decJaration of Osslo that "he was boss of the vVest Coast 
and he would fight for jurisdiction," the Butchers, assertedly 
for the purpose of providing ''observers'' to accompany 
Butchers' representatives and assist in "inspecting" markets 
which were permitting, or suspected of permitting, grocery 
clerks to sell the packaged foods, imported defendants Hazel, 
Cacio, Dempster, Dimitratos, and Tucker, hereinafter some-
times called the sailor defendants, from San :F'rancisco and 
started calling on the markets. 1 The hereinafter described 
brutal assault and battery upon Maurer, a business agent 
for the local Retail Clerks. followed. 
The evidence, pertinent portions of which are hereinafter 
summarized or quoted, is in some respects substantially con-
flicting, but in every respect is ample to support the verdicts. 
If the jury believed the prosecution witnesses and disbe-
lieved the testimonies of those defendants who took the stand, 
they properly could have felt that the cumulative effect of 
the evidence was not only sufficient, but overwhelming. Study 
of the record constrains us to conclude that the latter view 
is correct. [1] "The rule applicable where there is evidence, 
circumstantial or othenvise, that a crime has been committed 
and that the defendant was the perpetrator thereof, has been 
many times reiterated by the reviewing courts of this state 
as follows: The court on appeal 'will not attempt to deter-
mine the weight of the evidence, but will decide only whether 
upon the face of the evidence it can be held that sufficient 
facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant 
the inference of guilt. For it is the function of the jury 
in the first instance, and of the trial court after verdict, to 
determine what facts are established by the evidence, and 
before the verdict of the jury, which has been approved by 
the trial court, can be set aside on appeal upon the ground' 
of insufficiency of the evidence, 'it must be made clearly 
to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there suffi-
cient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached 
in the court below. . We must assume in favor of the 
verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could 
1The Clerks, too, had persons from elsewhere than San Diego assisting 
them in connection with the jurisdictional dispute, but they were mem-
bers of the Retail Clerks' Union and they did not become involved in 
violence. ''They ac,companied the local business agents here on field 
trips to observe where the merchandise was located in the markets that 
was in dispute and to assist in making diagrams of the stores, also to 
assist the local men in getting petitions signed to submit to the N a tiona! 
Labor Relations Board.'' 
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reasonably dedueed from the evidence, and then deter-
mine whether sueh faets are suffieient to support the verdict.' 
the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the 
the opinion of the reviewing court that those circum-
stances might also reasonably be reeoneiled with the inno-
of the defendant ·will not warrant interference with 
determination of the jury." (People v. Daugher·ty (1953), 
Cal.2d 876, 885 [256 P.2d 911].) 
Defendants' contentions require a rather extensive review 
of the evidence in order that they may be viewed and re-
solved in fair perspective to the entire ease. 
'Fhc Evide11cc. Jam!'s Ray ,Jackson, a business agent for 
Butchers, testifi('d for the proseeution as a rather re-
luctant witness. His testimony, read as a whole, and in the 
of the entire reeord, leads inevitably to the inferenee 
that the sailor defendants, Dimitratos, Cacio, Tucker, Demp-
ster, and Hazel, who were neither members of the Butchers' 
Union nor residents of San Dic'go, were !'mployed by the 
Butehers with the expectation that they would engage in 
aets of violence, although in terms Jackson insisted that they 
were employed merely as "observers." The substance of Jack-
son 's testimony is as follows: 
,Jackson's duties as business manager were "to sign con-
tracts, work on grievances, cheek violations" and "I do or-
ganizing . . . and any other work that is necessary to do.'' 
During the 18 years J aekson had been a member of the 
Butchers, defendant Osslo had been secretary-treasurer of 
the San Diego local to which Jaekson belonged. Osslo was 
president of the \V estern Federation of Butchers, the affiliated 
butchers' unions of California, and a member of the board 
and executive committee of the International Butchers' Union 
at the time of the assault and battery (October 22, 1955). 
In ,Iune, 1956, Osslo was !'leeted vice president of the Inter-
national. Membership in the Bnt!'hers in the United States 
was about 300,000. Defendant MeFaden had been a business 
agent of the San Diego local since 1941 and defendant Meyer 
had been a business agent since 1955. 
About Septemb!'r 8, 1955, there was a strike of the Butchers 
at the Food Basket Market because of an assert!'d "violation 
of eon tract" in that certain prepared and packaged complete 
dinners included meat items and sueh packages were being 
handled by the Clerks in the grocery department rather 
than by the Butchers. Afl a result of the strike the Food 
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Basket Market brought an injunction suit against the San 
Diego local of the Butchers. The court ordered that the 
disputed prepared dinners be taken off sale. It may be in-
ferred that a purpose of the order was the prevention of the 
sort of violent altercation which, as hereinafter related, forms 
the basis of defendants' conviction of assault. 
Concerning the relations between the Clerks and the 
Butchers at the time of the Food Basket strike, Jackson tes-
tified as follows : 
"Q. Now at Food Basket, ... did you talk with the 
Clerks representative while you were on strike at Food Basket, 
by any chance~ A. Yeah, I guess we did. General conver-
sation .... 
'' Q. Let me ask you this: Were you present at any con-
ferences at which any of the Clerks representatives discussed 
the Food Basket situation with Mr. Osslo ~ A. Sir, I had 
my foot broken the day before anything like that was dis-
cussed, I believe. . . . 
'' Q. Do you, of your own knowledge, know whether or 
not any discussions were held between Mr. Osslo and repre-
sentatives of the Retail Clerks Union? A. 'When 7 
'' Q. After and at about the time of the Food Basket inci-
dent. A. No, sir .... I don't know .... 
"Q. Now when was the eon tract that was in effect at Food 
Basket up for renewal~ A. November .... 
"Q. Yes. Now what are your functions as a business 
agent; just what do you do 7 A. My duties are to get-to 
sign contracts, work on grievances, check violations. . . . I 
do organizing, work on grievances, sign contracts, and any 
other work that is necessary to do.'' 
On October 12, 1955 (a Wednesday), the Clerks struck 
Ferguson's Market. Jackson and McFaden went to the mar-
ket. Approximately 25 clerks were present, among them 
Mr. Montgomery, hereinafter mentioned as one who was 
attacked but succeeded in escaping serious injury in the sub-
sequent assault of October 22, 1955. In addition to the mem-
bers of the Butchers who worked at the market, defendant 
McFaden, and ,Jackson, two or three other members of the 
Butchers' Union were present. The Clerks "gave us [the 
Butchers] some pretty good looks." Jackson felt that these 
"looks" were threatening. 
Discussions were had by the Butchers as to what they 
would do at stores where the Clerks walked out. Defendant 
Osslo was present at these discussions. 
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f:)ailors Dimitratos and Hazel arriYed in San Diego by 
airline from San Franeiseo on Saturda~·. October 15, 1955. 
On the following Monday thPy mPt with ddendants McFaden 
and MPyer and the witne;,;s ,Jaekson. Defendant Osslo had 
previously stated that Harry Lundeberg "was sending a 
l~ouple of fellows down to help us out, go with us, be our 
observers. and see that we weren't jumped from behind, or 
bothered." " I 'T] hey were to accompany us and work with 
us." There were older, unemployed memb0rs of the Butchers 
who eould have acted as observers bnt tht>y were not called 
upon to do so. 'fhe sailors ''were going to observe and--
'' Q. Observe what 'I A. Observe what was going on. 
"Q. \Vhat were they to do after they observed what was 
going on? A. To protect us and see that nobody created any 
trouble or violence or anything of that sort." 
The witness did not call the poliee for proteetion ; he did 
not know whether anyone else had done so. 
'' Q. \V ere the men from San Fram·iseo, the sailors, more 
proficient, to your knowledge, than the San Diego Police 
Department? A. \Vell, I don't know. MaybE' they might be 
for labor work. They know what to look for. 
'' Q. You mean that they are experienced in this type of 
au action, or this matter? A. \Vhat action are you talking 
about, sir? 
'' Q. \V ell, in coming down and being observers. You mean 
they were more experieueed in that line of work 7 A. I be-
lieve they would be. 
"Q. Than a police officer might be 1 A. I believe they 
would be, yes. 
'' Q. In what respect would they be more proficient? 
A. They worked iu labor for a good many years. That is 
their job, working as laboring people. 
'' Q. \Vhat are they going to observe? I am kind of in-
terested in that. \Vhat are they going to observe that an 
older dues paying member [of the Butchers] couldn't observe 1 
A. They eould observe what goes on. 
"Q. I see. In other words, what that takes is a good pair 
of eyes? A. It takes a little brains, too. 
"Q. \Vc'll, a man that has been a ma;;;ter craftsman and 
worked up to a head meat eutter would have those qualifica-
tions, wouldn't he? A. Some might. Most of them might. 
"Q. \Vhat were they to do after they observed? Were 
they to make any reports? A. Yeah. 
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'' Q. To whom were they to report~ A. I guess they would 
make them to our Secretary 1 
'' Q. Mr. Osslo 7 A. And to the IN estern Pedcration of 
Butchers or the State Pederation of Labor .... 
'' Q. \Vhat arc you looking for to observe? I am not clear 
on that or on these reports. Did they make any reports, let 
me ask you that? A. 'fhey reported on what they knew and 
saw. 
'' Q. They were oral reports, were they? A. Yes. 
'' Q. How often did they make the reports? A. I guess 
daily .... 
"Q. \Vhat I am interested in, Mr. Jackson, is this: ... 
why, if you are looking for just observers to go around and 
find out what is going on, didn't you give any preferential 
treatment to the local people in San Diego in other unions? 
A. Well, sir, not that I know of. 
"Q. Here is what I >vant to know: why is the Sailors 
Union selected as the ones you are going to go to to get 
observers? A. \Vell, I would assume that the reason is-I 
don't know for sure-these fellows are out on a ship and 
they come back in and they have got time on their hands 
waiting around for another ship. 
'' Q. Did you check any other labor hiring halls here in 
town, the laborers union, the plasterers union, or-- A. I 
didn't. 
'' Q. Do you know whether or not anybody else checked 
any of the other labor hiring halls locally to see if there 
were any people available that could be employed as observers? 
A. I don't know, sir. 
"Q. To your knowledge was that done? A. No, sir." 
'' [\V] e had told the other labor organizations in San Diego 
what was going on. Indirectly that is asking for help and 
aid. As far as specifically asking for the loaning of a man 
or two men or more, I don't know of that being done, sir." 
'' Q. What did Mr. Osslo say about the two men that were 
coming down, if anything? ... A. He said they were com-
ing down to go around with us. . . . 
'' Q. What did you do when you went around to these 
stores and what did they do to earn this $150.00 a week plus 
expenses [the amount which the sailors were paid by the 
Butchers]? A. They were with us .... 
'' Q. Tell me what the work was they were doing? A. 
Cherked the markets. 
'' Q. What do you do when you eheck a market? How did 
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know about a violation f They are sailors, aren't they 1 
They know what they are looking for. 
'' Q. \Vhat were they looking for 1 A. A violation of our 
contract in the meat department. 
"Q. How did they know a violation of a contract if they 
flew in from San Francisco and had a short meeting 
with you 1 Is it that easy that you can become a business 
¥ A. As I said before, ... they were here to go with 
us, act as observers and to protect us in case there might 
be any violence. . . . 
"Q. If there was a contract violation. How would they 
know what the contract was? A. \Ve would have to tell them. 
'' Q. You would have to tell them what was in your con-
tract? A. Point out the items, if there is a violation on the 
items. 
'' Q. These men are sailors and here is what I am confused 
about, and I would think an old timer in the meat business 
would have been important to you. \Vhat instructions did 
you give these men from San Franr.isco that made them pro-
ficient in a short period of time to be able to observe these 
contract violations, if there were any? A. The violations part 
of it wasn't necessarily their objective to observe. They were 
sent down here, or called down here, to protect us, as I said 
before, and see we weren't jumped from behind, or jumped 
at all. 
"Q. And the services of the San Diego Police Department, 
which are free, weren't ever used in that respect? . . . A. I 
did not call the police department, no, sir .... 
"Q. Were you in any way threatened 1 A. By certain 
gestures, yes, sir. 
"Q. When were you threatened by certain gesturrs T A. At 
Tang's Market. 
"Q. That is after Dimitratos and Hazel are with you, 
isn't it? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. I am talking about before, before these men are hired 
what gestures were made that caused you personally to feel 
that you had been threatened. A. The incident at Fergu-
son's .... I was in the alley between the truck and the 
building whrn several of them walked back .... 
"Q. What did they do? A. Actually nothing but give 
us a good look. . . . 
"Q. That scared you? A. It could have been a threatening 
look, yes, sir .... 
"Q. Well, who did you report the threatening looks you 
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got in the alley way at Perguson 's to? A. I believe they 
were all reported to each other, Brother Osslo, myself and 
Mack and Brother Meyer. 
'' Q. Did you ever report those threatening looks to the 
police department? A. I did not, no, sir. 
'' Q. As a mattrr of fact, you weren't even concerned with 
them, were you? A. Well, no, sir. . . . [After the question 
was read and reread) I was concerned .... 
"Q. You didn't report it to the police? A. 'l'here is not 
much to report, sir.'' 
'' Q .... In the particular market how would they [Dimi-
tratos and Hazel] know [which items were to be handled by 
the Butchers], just walking into the place? A. They wouldn't 
necessarily. They were with me or some of the rest of us .... '' 
McFaden arranged for hotel reservations for Dimitratos and 
Hazel and a few days later, when the additional three sailor 
defendants ( Cacio, Tucker and Dempster) were imported 
from San Prancisco, arranged for their reservations. 
The sailor defendants each received $150 a week plus airline 
transportation, hotel aceommodations and expenses from the 
Butchers. The salary of a beginning apprentiee butcher was 
$72 a week. The "top rate" which a journeyman butcher 
was paid was $102 a week. A head meat cutter received $107 
a week. Jackson, as business agent, received $140 a week. 
Dimitratos and Hazel attended union meetings of the 
Butchers. Such meetings were not open to the public but 
"We have visitors. Anyone working for the organization is 
permitted," and frequently visitors not connected with the 
union were invited. 
At Tang's (sometimes called Ming's) Market a representa-
tive of the Clerks assertedly threatened the witness .Jackson 
by telling him that the Clerks "were taking everything that 
bleeds, all the red meat, everything. That is not only a 
threat to me, that is a threat on the organization, the way 
I took it .... 
"Q. Did you report it to the police department? A. No, sir. 
"Q. Did you report it to Mr. Osslo? A. Yes, sir .... I re-
ported to McFaden and he, in turn, reported it, and Mr. 
Dimitratos and Mr. Hazel were there.'' 
At Tang's Market one Butlrr, a Clerk, assrrtrdly "dis-
played" a knifr. Counsel asked: 
"Q. Now was there any display of a knife? A. Yes, sir .... 
"Q. And what was Butler doing with the knife? A. Play-
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with it, fumbling it, handling it ... he [was) cleaning 
his fingernails with it ... 
"Q. What did Butler do with the knife when you came 
over ... and were introduced to him 1 A.. He didn't have the 
knife in his hand at that time, sir." He had been "say 
twelve to fifteen feet" away when the witness saw him with 
the knife. Mr. Anderson, another representative of the 
Clerks, ''came storming in,'' according to the testimony of 
Dimitratos; the bulge of a gun was visible ''On his left arm 
pit up in the shoulder ... You could just about see the shape 
of it.'' But apparently no one claimed to have actually 
seen a gun. The testimony of Mr. Jackson continues: 
"Q. Did Mr. Anderson threaten you at all? A. Only in a 
w·ay that he carried himself. 
'' Q. How did he carry himself¥ A. Pushed his way through 
. . the crowd, through the store. 
'' Q. Who did he push ? A.. He didn't push anyone. I 
say pushed his way through." 
When Jackson's recollection was refreshed he admitted that 
he had testified before the grand jury that at Tang's no 
threats were made to him or in his presence . 
.After the incidents at Tang's Market, defendants Cacio, 
Tucker, and Dempster were also hired by the Butchers and 
brought from San Francisco to San Diego. 
At about 11 o'clock on the morning of October 22 the five 
sailor defendants together with McFaden, Meyer, Jackson, 
and one Woodard, an International representative of the 
Butchers, went to Ferguson's Market. This was the first 
occasion that Cacio, Dempster, and Tucker went out with 
the Butchers. There was a slowdown in the meat department 
for about 40 minutes. Ferguson's was said to be "one of the 
sensitive points'' in the jurisdictional dispute. The group of 
Butchers' representatives accompanied by their five sailor 
employes then went to two other markets, in each of which 
they remained only a few minutes. The sailors assertedly 
were present ''as observers, witnesses, whatever you want to 
call it." The group returned to Ferguson's Market and 
''started a conversation" with one of the proprietors. Stand-
ing in the market were Montgomery and Maurer. The pro-
prietor pointed out Montgomery and Maurer as Clerks. 
[2] The testimony of various witnesses as to how many 
of the sailors actively participated in the ensuing assault 
and battery is conflicting. However, the following direct 
evidence supports a determination that all five of the sailor 
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defendants actively participated: These five defendants sur-
rounded Clerks Montgomery and Maurer and some of the 
defendants stomped on Montgomery's and Maurer's feet. 
"Dimitratos and Hazel attempt [ ed] to get Montgomery, but 
he ... [though pursued] got away and they stepped right 
back out ... Maurer couldn't get ... past the customers 
because of a railing and a bunch of pushcarts . . . and he 
was being pursued ... until two men got hold of him and held 
him ... " Cacio struck Maurer in the stomach. Dempster 
and Tucker pinned Maurer's arms to his sides. "Dimitratos 
judo chopped him terribly, fifteen or twenty shots,'' and 
"Hazel was bombing in with his fists and with judo chops." 
Maurer was beaten and kicked. '' [\V] hen they let go and 
dropped him to the floor he was in kind of a hulk lying on his 
side. That is when Cacio used the boots on him .... Kicked 
him in the back twice and then he flopped over on his back 
and he was kicked, I think, right in the side terribly hard.'' 
The witness then ''Checked to see if the police were called, 
checked to see if the ambulance had been called.'' 
[3] Defendants' argument that there is no ''credible'' 
evidence that Dempster, Dimitratos, and Hazel participated 
in the assault is obviously completely devoid of merit when 
presented to a reviewing court. Such argument goes to the 
weight of the evidence, and resolution of the conflicting evi-
dence is for the trier of fact. (People v. Daugherty (1953), 
supra, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885.) 
McFaden, Meyer, Jackson, ·woodard, and the five sailor 
defendants had gone to Ferguson's Market in two ears; some 
of the Butchers and some of the sailors were in each car. 
When they fled from the market after the assault and 
battery, the sailors left in one car and the Butchers left 
in the other car. 
A cashier at the market had obtained the license number 
of the car in which the sailors fled. A boy also attempted 
to write down the license number but one of the defendants 
snatched it from the boy's hand. Police officers, immediately 
notified of the license number, stopped the car, arrested the 
sailors, took them to the police station, and questioned them. 
Defendant Dempster stated to the police that although he 
had been at Ferguson's Market he knew nothing about a fight 
there. He also falsely denied that he had any connection 
with the Butchers. He stated that he had come from San 
Francisco on a vacation. 
Defendant Tucker at first refused to answer police questions 
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about whether he had been at Ferguson's Market. He stated 
that he had come to San Diego to do some drinking and to 
visit Tia Juana. In a subsequent conversation with the 
Tucker stated that he had been at Ferguson's Market 
and that there had been a fight but denied that he or his 
friends were involved in the fight. He also falsely denied that 
the Butchers had hired him. 
Defendant Dimitratos stated to the officers that he had come 
to San Diego for a vacation; that neither he nor the group 
he was with were involved in the fight to his knowledge. On 
witness stand he admitted prior conviction of felony and 
that he made false statements to the officers. 
Defendant Cacio told the officerR that he had been drinking; 
that he vaguely remembered being hit or kicked, but that 
he did not remember hitting anyone. He denied knowing 
who Jackson and defendant McFaden >Yere and also falsely 
denied that he 1vas employed by the Butchers. 
Defendant Hazel told the officers that he was in San Diego 
on a vacation and had no interest in unions; that he and 
defendant Dempstor had gone into F'erguson 's Market to buy 
cough drops; that he knew nothing of any fight; and that he 
did not know McF'aden or Jackson. 
On November 27, 1955, defendant Moyer told a police 
officer that he had not been at F'erguson's Market on 
October 22. 
[ 4] The foregoing statements of defendants to the officers 
concerned matters which were within the defendants' own 
knowledge, they related materially to the issue of their guilt 
or innocence of the offenses of which they now stand con-
victed, and they were manifestly false through deliberate and 
willful intent. Such falsifications cogently evidence conscious-
ness of guilt and suggest that there is no honest explanation 
for ineriminating circumstanees, and thus are admissions of 
guilt. (l'coplc Y. Darmw (19:31), 212 Cal. 167. 177 [1] 
P. 1]; People v. Tolson (1952), 109 Cal.App.2d 579, 581 
[241 P.2d 32] ; People v. FarreU (1951), 107 Cal.App.2d 
29 [2] [236 P.2d 424]; see also People v. Wayne (1953), 
41 Cal.2d 814. 822-828 [ 4, 5] [264 P.2d 547]; conc:urring 
opinion of Mr .• Justice 'l'raynor in People v. Albertson (1944), 
2:J Cal.2d 550, 581-fi82 [147 P.2d 7].) 
At the trial defendants Hazel, Dimitratos, Cacio, and 
Dempster testified. Defendants Osslo, M:cF'aden, Moyer, and 
Tueker did not take the fltand. 
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The Butchers paid bail bond fees of $4,500 for the sailor 
defendants. They paid $10,000 to a private investigator for 
an investigation of this matter. 
It must be borne in mind that the jurors not only heard 
the evidence which has been summarized but also had the 
benefit of observing the defendants and the witnesses from 
day to day during the trial, and that the reeord shows the 
reeeipt in evidenee of 59 exhibits. These exhibits indudc 
pictures of the seene of the assault, reeords of telephone calls 
among the defendants, and records of expenditures of the 
Butchers on behalf of and to the sailor defendants. 
Defendants do not dispute that the overt acts charged in 
the conspiracy count of the indictment were proved. 2 But 
they urge that it does not appear that these overt acts were 
a part of a conspiracy. It is true that there is no direct evi-
dence of a conspiracy: all the direct evidence bearing on the 
question is to the effect that the defendants who actually 
participated in the assault and batter.'' had been instructed to 
avoid the use of violence. [5] But ''A conspiracy can gen-
erally be established only by circumstantial evidence. It is 
not often that the direct fact of a common unlawful design 
can be proved other than by the establishment of independent 
facts bearing on such design." (People v. Robinson ( 1954), 
43 Cal.2d 132, 136 [ 1] [271 P .2d 865] ; People v. Steccone 
(1950), 36 Cal.2d 234, 237-238 [2, 3] [223 P.2d 17]; cases 
'Those acts are as follows: 
No. 1. That defendant Osslo had a conversation with Harry Lunde-
berg on October 13, 19iifi. 
No. 2. That Dimitratos and Hazel came to San Diego on October 
15, 1935. 
No. 3. That McFaden, at the request of Osslo, made reservations for 
three rooms about October 14. 
No. 4. That McFaden, Dimitratos, and Hazel met on October 15. 
No. 5. That Hazel and Dimitratos met at the Butchers' local on 
October 17. 
No. 6. That Dimitratos, Hazel, Meyer and other representatives of 
the Butchers met at Tang's :Market on Oetober 18. 
No. 7. That Dempster, Cacio, and Tucker met in San Diego on Oc-
tober 21. 
No. 8. That Dempster, Caeio, •rucker, Dimitratos, and Hazel mot in 
San Diego on October 21. 
No. 9. That Dimitratos, Cacio, Tucker, Dempster, and Hazc-l accom-
panied McFnden and Meyer to :Ferguson's Market on October 22. 
No. 10. That Dempster, Cacio, 'Tucker, Dimitratos, and Hazel were 
in an automobile leased by the Butchers on October 22. 
Nos. 11 through 15. That Osslo or McFadden agreed to pay each of 
the sailor defendants a weekly salary and expenses. 
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collected in 5 McKinney's New Calif. Digest, Conspiracy, 
§ 23.) 
Undisputed evidence establishes the following facts: After 
the jurisdictional dispute between the Butchers and the 
Clerks began, and prior to the assault here, prosecution wit-
ness ,Jackson and defendants Osslo, McFaden, and Meyer, 
and representatives of the Butchers, met with representatives 
of the Clerks; Osslo said that the Butchers were going to 
"show" the Clerks; he said that he was "top man" on the 
west coast and "that was it." Anticipating violence-assert-
<'dly that representatives of the Butchers would be "jumped" 
by the Clerks-Osslo, through the Sailors Union of the Pa-
eiik, imported and employed the :five sailor defendants, and 
defendants McFaden and Meyer assented to their employment. 
Dimitratos, Hazel, 'rucker, and Dempster had been members 
of the Sailors Union of the Pacific for a number of years, 
and Cacio, a 'reamster, had sailed in the Merchant Marine. 
Members of the Sailors Union of the Pacific had participated 
in other labor disputes to which that union was not a party 
and had committed an assault and battery in connection with 
onr such dispute. 
[6] It is a reasonable inference that Osslo, McFaden, and 
Meyer, who had been actively and extensively engaged in 
union affairs, knew of such participation and assault and 
battery. Pretending concern for their own safety, but never 
asking police protection, OsRlo, with the assent and aid of 
McPaden and Meyer, set up a situation which inferentially 
was designed to, and which elearly did, increase the likeli-
hood of violence in the jurisdictional dispute. On a view of 
the evidence favorable to the prosecution, which the law at 
this stage of the proceeding requires of us, it is fairly inferri-
ble that Osslo, McFaden, and Mryer at least tacitly under-
stood, anticipated, and agreed that the remaining :five 
defendants would not merely be present to act as "observers" 
and prott>ct the Butchers from violence, but would and should 
initiatE' the violence, which they subsequently did initiate, to 
"Rhow" the Clerks that Osslo indeed "was boss of the West 
Coast and he would :fight for jurisdiction" and "that was it." 
Admission and Rejection of Evidence. [7] Defendants 
urge that it was prejudicial error to admit evidence that mem-
bers of the Sailors Union of the Pacific participated in other 
labor disputPs to which that union was not a party, 'lnd 
that some of such members (not the defendants here) were 
guilty of assault and battery in connection with their partici-
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pation in such a dispute. 'l'his evidence, m the light of the 
other circumstances, including the prior activities of Osslo, 
:M:c:Faden, and JYieyer, was properly admitted as tending to 
show that the last named defendants contemplated that the 
employment of the sailor defendants probably wonk! result 
in acts of violence by the latter defendants. 
[8] Evidenee was received concerning :fights, unconnected 
with union aetivities, in 1951 involving Dimitratos and in 
1952 involving Dimitratos and Dempster. The evidence was 
expressly reeeived as to the eonspiracy charge only. The 
trial judge so instructed the jury at the time it was admitted. 
He further then instrueted them that if they believed the 
evidence ''it would only teud to show the eharaeteristies of a 
particular defendant in this case, and if that charaeteristie 
goes to the offense and if a eonspiracy is shown, it would be 
binding on all the defendants so far as the eonspiracy eount 
is eoneerned." The theory on whieh this evidence was re-
eeived is erroneous. That Osslo, with :M:eF'aden and Meyer, 
employed persons who had previously partieipated in :fights 
unconnected with union activity does not tend to show that 
those persons were hired with the expeetation that they would 
eommit assaults connected with union activity, for there is 
no showing that Osslo, :M:cFadcn, or Meyer knew of the 1951 
and 1952 altercations. However, in view of the ample evidence 
that Dimitratos and Dempster participated in the assault and 
battery here material, and in the light of the circumstances 
surrounding their importation and employment, it does not 
appear that the jury could have been misled by evidence that 
they had been involved in other altercations. 
[9] Defendants complain of the admission of evidence of 
many telephone calls between the defendants and other mem-
bers of their organizations. 'fhis evidence was properly re-
ceived to show defendants' association; that that association 
was criminal is shown by the other evidenee, viewed as a 
whole. 
[10] Defendants complain of the admission in evidence of 
the testimony of a police officer concerning the arrest of 
Clerks Anderson and ·weathers on November 1, 1955, after 
the assault of which defendants were convicted. This testi-
mony was as follows: Defendant Osslo told the officer that 
his life had been threatened by Anderson. The offieer located 
Anderson and Weathers was with him. At the officer's request 
Anderson and ·weathers aeeompanied the officer to the police 
station. The district attorney, after deputies examined an 
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affidavit furnished by the Butchers on which their charge was 
based, refused to take action in the matter. The city prose-
cutor filed charges against Anderson, but they were dis-
missed. This testimony tends to show that defendant Osslo, 
after the assault, attempted to harass the Clerks by unsub-
stantiated accusations and to distract emphasis from the 
charges against him by countercharges; it was thus admissible 
as tending to show that Osslo was a conspirator carrying on an 
effort to make good his declaration that he "was boss of the 
West Coast and he would fight for jurisdiction,'' and not, 
as he argues, the innocent employer of persons who were to 
act as ''observers'' or at the most to show the Clerks that the 
Butchers were protected, without the exercise of force. 
[11] Defendants complain that the trial judge refused to 
permit Jackson to testify that on October 13, 1955, defendant 
:McFaden reported to Jackson and defendant Osslo that he 
had been frightened by a group of Clerks at Ferguson's 
:Market. This testimony was relevant to the purpose of the 
employment of the sailor defendants and should have been 
admitted, but in the light of the entire record its exclusion 
certainly did not prejudice defendants. 
The Crime of Conspiracy to Commit Assault. Defendants 
urge that the charge of ''Conspiracy to Commit the Crime 
of Assault (PC 182) " is not a charge of a crime under the 
laws of this state because no statute prescribes a punishment 
for such a crime. Section 182 of the Penal Code provides in 
material part: 
"If two or more persons conspire: 
"1. To commit any crime. [Subdivisions 2 through 6 enu-
merate specified objects of criminal conspiracy.) . . . 
"They are punishable as follows: (The next three para-
graphs prescribe the punishment for conspiracy to commit 
crimes against certain officials, for conspiracy to commit any 
other felony, and for conspiracy to commit two or more 
felonies which have different punishments.] . . . 
''When they conspire to do any of the other acts described 
in this section they shall be punishable by imprisonment in 
the county jail for not more than one year, or in the State 
prison for not more than three years, or by a fine not exceed-
ing five thousand dollars ( $5.000) or both." 
[12] According to defendants, conspiracy to commit a 
misdemeanor assault is not one of the acts ''described in 
this section.'' But, as defendants concede, it was held in 
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Doble v. Superior Court (19251, l!l7 CaL 565 12J [241 
P. 852] (where the question was whether section 182 of the 
Penal Code provided punishment for a conspiracy to violate 
the Corporate Securities Act), that ''it was the legislative 
intention that the words 'any crime' should include all 
crimes-whether felonies or misdemeanors-which are known 
to the laws of this state and whether defined and made punish-
able by the Penal Code or by any other law or statute of 
this state," and ( p. 566 [ 5] of 197 Cal.) "the words 'any 
of the other acts described in this section' were meant to, 
and do in fact, include all other conspiracies to commit crimes 
or acts prohibited by the section [182] regardless of whether 
they are denounced by subdivision 1 or any other subdivision 
thereof." We conclude that the Doble case is applicable here. 
Misconduct of the District Attorney. Certain specifications 
of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney, hereinafter dis-
cussed, present the most nearly substantial basis for attack-
ing the verdicts, but the evidence so overwhelmingly supports 
the implied findings that it does not appear reasonable to 
believe that the misconduct was a contributing factor in the 
jury's arriving at such verdicts. 
[13] Defendants complain of a press release of the prose-
cuting attorney which was published before trial. This press 
release stated that the defendants were attempting to delay 
trial. In this connection the record indicates that on the 
day the case was to have gone to trial in the regular criminal 
department (Department 4), that department was engaged 
in a trial. The presiding judge in Department 2 was willing 
to select a jury to be used for actual trial in Department 
4 and for that purpose the case was transferred from Depart-
ment 4 to Department 2. Defense counsel announced 
defendants' willingness to be tried in Department 2, either 
with or without a jury, but objected to having a jury selected 
by one judge and then having the actual trial proceed before 
another judge. The case was thereafter continued in Depart-
ment 2 from time to time for a week until Department 4 was 
available for selection of the jury and further trial. The 
press release to the effect that defendants were attempting to 
delay the trial appears unfair; defendants were merely ob-
jecting, as they had a right to do, regardless of whether their 
objection was or was not meritorious, to the procedure (de-
scribed by the presiding judge as ''standard procedure in 
this County") of having a jury selected by one judge and the 
actual trial conducted by another judge. However, it does 
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not appear that the newspaper statement prejudiced defend-
ants in the eyes of the jury which tried their case. The trial 
judge, in accord with the request of defendants' counsel, spe-
eifieally admonished the jurors to pay no attention to this 
artide and generally admonished them to pay no attention to 
newspaper articles. 
[14] During the voir dire examination of the prospective 
jnrors the prosecuting attomey asked such questions as, "You 
don't believe that might makes right?,'' ''And do you feel 
that a pt>rRon, beeanse he is a member of a labor union, 
deserves to get beat 11p ouce in a while?," and "You wouldn't 
permit sympathy or the feE' ling to 'let 't-> give him another 
dwnee' to iufluenee your deeision in this matter~" These 
questions, of which defendants complain, were not improper; 
they were designed to dicit relevant information concerning 
the prospective jurors' state of mind. (15] The question, 
''You know a clerk was beaten'?," of which defendants corn-
plain, was not in the circumstances improper and certainly 
c·ould not be prejudicial; the fact was indubitably established 
and it concerned the very subject of the assault charge which 
the jurors were being selected to try. Other questions com-
plained of by defendants need not here be quoted; they were 
('ither prop0r or not prejudieial. 
[16] Complaint is made of the following matters in the 
proseenting attorney's opening statement: The prosecuting 
attorney said, '' lH r. Max .J. Osslo was a member of the 1955 
Grand Jury that returned the indictment.'' Defense counsel, 
moving to strike the statement, said, ''Although everybody 
knows that, it is ineompet0nt, irrelevant and immaterial." In 
Yiew of the concession that "everybody knows that" it does 
not appear that the mention of the fact before the jury could 
have prejudiced defendants. 
[17] The prosecuting attorney stated at some length de-
tails c·oncerning the secretary-treaRurer of another Butchers' 
loeal being ''worried about Osslo and worried about goons.'' 
Evidenee conc0rning this matter was subsequently excluded. 
It does not appear that the refer0nce to the matter could 
Jurn: pr0j ndiced defN1dan ts. This and other references to 
"goons" by the prosecuting attorney wer0 no more improper, 
in the light of the evidence developed by the prosecution, 
than would be a r0ferrnee to "thiev<'S" in a rase in which 
1lef1'11dants ·were on trial for larceuy. 
[18] 'l'he trial judge instructed the jury before the taking 
of evidence began, as well as at the dose of the case. In the 
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course of his preliminary instruction he commenced to read 
an instruction concerning assault with a deadly weapon which 
the prosecuting attornry had incorrectly included in his re-
quested instructions. The judge immrdiately stopped reading 
and asked the prosecuting attorney if it was his contention 
that a deadly weapon was used. The attorney answered, 
"No. By means of fol'(:e," but then said, "A prize fighter is 
a weapon?'' 'fhis remark or query was improper, as was 
the request for an instruction concerning assault with a 
deadly weapon. But these incidents, not persisted in before 
the jnry, do not appear to have been prejudicial. 
[19] Defendants complain that during the course of trial 
the prosecution brought into the courtroom and the sight of 
the jury a board on whirh were pictures referred to by counsel 
as "rogue's gallery" photographs of the defendants, made 
at the time of their arrest. The court declined to permit 
the use of these photographs in evidence. It is defendants' 
position that the prose(·ution, knowing that the photographs 
were improper, brought them into the courtroom in a manner 
such that the jury saw thrm and were prejudiced. The 
record does not disclose that the jury saw these photographs 
clearly or at length, but only that there was a di:;;pute between 
prosecution and defense counsel as to whether they could 
readily have been seen by the jury. In the cireumstances, 
even assuming that the jury did see the photographs, it is 
not shown that defrndants were harmed. The jury were 
clearly and repeatedly instructed that they must determine 
the facts from the evidence produced in court, and that they 
must not consider any offer of evidence which was rejected 
by the court. 
[20] Objeetion was made and sustained to two questions of 
the prosecution as to whether Mr. Lunde berg supplied ''strong 
arm men" for use in labor disputes. The use of the term 
"strong arm men," in the light of the evidence of circum-
stances under which the sailor defendants were employed by 
the Butchers, appears more realistic than prejudicial. In a 
pretrial statement of defpndant Osslo in connection with his 
motion to quash the indictment it is admitted that "Osslo 
turned to Harry I~undeberg for help. 'fhis procedure in 
labor circles is not considered unusual. The mere presence 
of some formidable appearing men to accompany his business 
representatives he felt both would 'offset the pressure' and 
reduce the possibility of' designs of injury.' " 
[21] A witness testified that a person whom she had seen 
, 
PEOPLE v. OssLo 
150 C.2d 75: 32;3 P.2d 3971 
101 
a the timP of the assault "iR tlw sPeond gentleman," indi-
ting tJw rlcfrll(]ant CIJCin. The: prnsr••nting aitnrnr:v >:aid, 
r to ihe USP of thP word 'grntlr>mau.'" Iu r·ontrast 
to \Yhat neeurred in People v. WilliaiJJS ( 19-12), 55 Cal.App. 
2d 696,700-702 [181 P.2d 8311, the trial juclge hr>re imme-
rehuked the prosr>euting attorney and admonished the 
to disregard his remark. In the eirnnnstauees, the re-
buke and admonishment appear suffi<,ient to <·ure any harm 
whieh might have resulted from the proseenting attorney's 
hig·hly improper remark, and the 'Williams ease is not author-
i1 to the contrary. 
[22] A poliee officer tcstifled that he saw two of the sailor 
ddelldants in Osslo 's offiee. 'l'he prosecuting attorney asked, 
"As a matter of fact, if you hadn't seen them in Osslo 's 
offiee yon would have run them out of town 7'' This question 
followed the offieer 's testimony that "I didn't like a eouple of 
big, huslry men walking around as bodyguards and gave the 
appea.ranee of being toughs of the worst sort.'' Defense 
l'Otmsel objeeted that the prosecuting attorney's question was 
n1 iscomluet and the trial judge said, "'I' hat is uncalled for, 
1\Ir. 0 'I-'aughlin [the prosecuting attorney]. Don't repeat it. 
Proceed." It does not appear, in the light of the trial 
judge's rebuke, and of the faets that the jurors had ample 
opportunity to determiw~ from personal observatiou whether 
the defendants were ''big, huRky men,'' and were admonished 
that they must deeide the issues of fact on the evidence before 
them, not upon remarks of counsel, that the improper question 
was prejudicial. 
[23] 'rhe proseeutiug attorney asked defendant Dimi-
tratos, when Dimitratos was tr>stifying, ''As a matter of fact, 
any time IJundcberg gets in any type of dispute that he is 
out for a jurisdictional grab it is the old Communist slogan 
hr uses-~.'' DE'fense coun:wl i11ierrupted with an ohjeetion 
and the trial judge sustained the objretion and direeted the 
jury to "disregard it." In the eireumstanees the interrupted, 
improper question docs not appear to have been prejuclieiaL 
[24] 'fwiee defense counsel objected to the prosecuting 
attorney's "yelling" at the defendant Caeio while Caeio was 
being (•ross-examined. On eac:h oeeasion the trial judge 
replied that the prosecuting attorney could use any tone of 
voice which he wished to use. Although conceivably there 
eould be circumstances under whieh the court's ruling might 
be questionable, it is not shown that the asserted "yelling" 
intimidated the witness or harmed defendants. Hence, we 
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cannot determine that the ruling was either erroneous or 
prejudicial. 
[25] In closing argument the prosecuting attorney re-
ferred to a case in which "a man died in the gas chamber" 
because of a battery, assertcdly similar to that administered 
to the elerk Maurer by the flailor defendants, whi~h resulted 
in the death of a woman. The judge promptly admonished 
the prosecuting attorney to "Confine yourself to this case." 
It does not appear that the defendants were harmed by the 
reference to the homicide case. 
[26] Defendants complain of the reference of the prose-
cuting attorney to Mr. Lundeberg and Mr. Jackson as "unin-
dicted co-conspirators.'' 'l'he reference, although unfair to 
those gentlemen in the sense that they were not before the 
court and thus were not in a position to answer the charge, 
could not have been prejudicial to the defendants. It sug-
gested only that entirely tenable view of the evidence which 
was taken by the prosecuting attorney and which we must 
presume was taken by the jury. Hence it did not constitute 
misconduct. 
[27] The prosecuting attorney in argument stated, ''Meyer 
is the finger man.'' \V e have discovered no evidence to this 
effect. It appears that any prejudicial effect of the reference 
was corrected by the trial judge's prompt admonition that 
"The jury will remember the evidence .... [I] f the evidence 
isn't there the inference isn't there and they will disregard it.'' 
It is to be noted that the prosecuting attorney at the begin-
ning of his argument said, ''what I am about to say is not 
evidence and if, in any way your version of the evidence is 
different than mine, you please take your own version of it." 
And the judge clearly and repeatedly instructed the jury that 
they were to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and 
further clearly instructed them that arguments of counsel 
were not evidence.3 
[28] Defendants object to statements in argument of the 
prosecuting attorney that Mr. Lunde berg was "a bed fellow 
3 The judge told the jury, among other things, that "it is up to you to 
determine what the facts are from the evidence introduced at the trial. 
... You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in this 
trial and the law as stated to you by me .... [Y]ou must determine 
the facts from the evidence produced here in court,'' and ''argument of 
counsel on both sides is not evidence .... Whatever they say about 
the evidence, if you find that to be true, why you follow it. If whatever 
either side said about the evidence doesn't correspond with your views 
as you heard the evidence as it came in, why you disregard any comments 
they made and follow the evidence as you see it.'' 
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of Harry Bridges," that "It is two per cent his [Lunde-
berg's] fight against Communism and ninety eight per cent 
his grab for jurisdictional power,'' and other similar state-
ments. These statements were made in reply to defense coun-
sel's argument that "The Sailors Union was the only thing 
that stood between complete Communist control of the Mari-
time industry since 1935 and Harry Lundeberg personally 
was responsible for that on every occasion. He held that 
Sailors Union right and the Sailors Union had to fight in 
order to hold itself to keep from coming under the Bridges' 
control, as every other Maritime Union did." In the circum-
stances the statements of the prosecution were not prejudiciaL 
[29] The Conditions of Probation. Defendants argue that 
the conditions of probation exceeded the trial judge's power 
bv reason of the provision that defendants Osslo, McFaden, 
a~d Meyer shall not, during the 10-year probationary period, 
hold any union position or receive remuneration from any 
union. However, since it could be and presumably was found 
that these defendants are guilty of crimes growing out of 
union activities, it appears not improper that restrictions be 
placed upon such activities as a condition of probation. 
[30] The granting of probation is entirely within the 
sound diseretion of the trial court; a defendant has no right 
to probation; he does have the right, if he feels that the terms 
of probation are more harsh than the sentence imposed by 
law, to refuse probation and undergo such sentence. (People 
v. Frank (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 740,741-742 [211 P.2d 350).) 
In the Frank case the defendant, a pediatrician, was convicted 
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor by a lewd act 
committed on a child in a plaster cast. It was held proper 
that the terms of his probation include the requirement that 
defendant not praetice medicine during the five years he was 
on probation. The court specifically rejected the argument, 
similar to the argument of defendants Osslo, MeFaden, and 
Meyer here, that the condition of probation was unreasonable 
and beyond the power of the court. 
Defendants are mistaken in their argument that the trial 
judge imposed on Osslo, McFaden, and Meyer county jail 
sentences and independently of such sentences granted periods 
of probation. Each probation order expressly suspends im-
position of sentence and provides that probation is granted 
on the condition, among others, that defendant spend a desig-
nated number of months in the county jail. 
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[31] It does not appear that the trial judge had power to 
impose the following terms in his probation orders: "that 
this Court and Judge shall retain jurisdiction of this matter 
throughout the said period of probation and no other depart-
ment of the Court or other Judge shall modify this order 
without notice to the Judge who tried the case." An individ-
ual judge (as distinguished from a court) is not empowered to 
retain jurisdietion of a cause. The cause is before the court, 
not the individual judge of that court, and the jurisdiction 
whieh the judgc> c>xercises is tbe jurisdiction of the eourt, not 
of the judge. [32] Rules of court which provide that post-
trial proceedings in a cause shall be heard by the judge who 
tried the matter arc entirely proper, but the individual judge 
cannot order that such proeeedings must be heard by him. 
The Asserted Channeling of the Case into a Par-ticular De-
partment. By stipulation this ease was set for trial on July 
9, 1956. All proceedings up to and including the making of 
the stipulation were had in Department 4 (Judge John A. 
Hewieker). The minutes of Department 4 show that on 
.July 9 the cause was transferred to Department 2 (Presiding 
Judge Turrentine) for trial. Actually, the reporter's tran-
script shows, the transfer was for the purpose of selecting 
a jury only. The reporter's transcript further shows that, as 
already indicated, defense counsel refused to accede to the 
procedure of having a jury selected in Department 2 while 
the trial then pending in Department 4 was being completed 
and tben having the eause transferred to DepartmPnt 4 for 
completion of trial. Defense counsel moved that the cause 
be assigned to any available department for immediate trial. 
The court stated, "Motion granted, and the first court avail-
able will be Judge Hewicker, the regular criminal depart-
ment .... [T]he case will be continued until two o'clock at 
which time the defendants, and all attorneys, and the jury is 
asked to return. If \Ve are not ready then, why we will have 
to have continuances half a day at a time until we have a court 
available to try this case. I can't tell you exaetly when that 
will be, but the case in ,Judge Hewicker's court may terminate 
at any moment ... or it may take the rest of the week, but 
there is no alternative to that procedure ... " Defense coun-
sel ohjerted to the l'Ont inuanee ''on the gronud that there are 
courts available and that there is going to be a civil trial 
to be started in one of the Superior Courts this morning, and 
a criminal case has precedence over a criminal [sic] ease." 
The court said, "Objection overruled." 
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The cause was r:ontinued two or three times each day until 
16 when selection of a jury began in Department 4 
before ,Judge Hewicker. On numerous oceasions defense 
counsel objected to the <'Ontinnan<'es, point,•d out that eivil 
eases were commenced in other departments and that a jury 
had been selected in another department to try a criminal case 
which was originally set for trial later than defendants' 
ease, and urged that the continuances were "part of the plan 
to channel a case into a particular court.'' 
,Judge 'l'urrcntine, in overruling one of defense eounsel's 
objections to a continuance, explained at some length the 
reasons for the continuances. He said that "the case was 
originally pending in that Department [ 4] and was to go to 
trial there and it was only sent to this Department by Judge 
IIewicker for the purpose of getting a jury to try the case .... 
n view of the objection to me trying-to me selecting a 
jury the only thing that could logically happen would be 
that it would go back to the Department where it originated 
and should be because Department 4 is the Presiding Criminal 
Department, and I am complying with the suggestion and 
request of Judge Hewicker." 
Judge Turrentine further stated that the selection of a jury 
by a department other than the one in which the case was 
to be tried ''is almost routine in this County. So we assumed 
. . . that on July 9th we would proceed in this Department 
to srlect the jury in order to give you a speedy trial and 
this was done at the request and suggestion of Judge Hewicker. 
It necessitated a very considerable rearrangement of business 
in this County to do it. \Ve have four regular judges either 
away or assigned to duty on the District Court of Appeal, 
and, of course, we have the rather long trial in Department 4 
going on. It is our general policy in criminal cases to give 
preference to the trial of those criminals who are incarcerated 
iu jail so if they are deprived of their liberty unlawfully they 
may have their day in court and get out in preference to those 
who have the financial means to make bail ... [Defendants 
were at liberty on bail.] If it were not for the fact that we 
had members of the San Diego County Bar who were willing 
to serve as Judges pro tem without compensation to them-
SPlves we would just simply be bogged down with nothing but 
a number of these short jury trials where the defendants are 
in jail awaiting trial.'' 
'fhe judge went on to explain the condition of the calendar 
in various departments, pointing out that a jury trial of a 
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person confined as mentally ill was being had in one depart-
ment, that the juvenile calendar was ''very congested,'' and 
that ''today we have three criminal trials going on out of 
five regular judges, one regular and two pro tems . . . '' 
[33] Defendants contend that the eontinuanee of the ease 
after the date set for trial, when eivil eases were being tried in 
other departments, was in violation of seetion 681a of the 
Penal Code ("The welfare of the people of the state of 
California requires that all proeeedings in eriminal eases 
shall be heard and determined at the earliest possible time. 
It shall be the duty of all eourts and judieial offieers and of 
all district attorneys to expedite the hearing and determina-
tion of all such eases and proeeedings to the greatest degree 
that is consistent with the ends of justiee") and the provision 
of section 1050 of that code that ''Criminal cases shall be 
given preeedence over all civil matters and proceedings.'' 
It does not appear that the poliey of sections 681a and 
1050 was disregarded. Judge Turrentine's explanation of the 
condition of the calendar shows that defendants were not 
being deprived of precedence over civil cases for any arbitrary 
reason and that the continuanees to enable trial in Department 
4 were not made for the purpose of improperly channeling the 
case into that department. Rather, it appears that the orderly 
administration of a crowded calendar required the continu-
ances to enable trial of the case in a proper department. The 
precedence to which criminal cases are entitled is not of such 
an absolute and overriding charaeter that the system of 
having separate departments for civil and criminal matters 
must be abandoned. And certainly it does not appear, as 
defendants suggest, that the "channeling" of this cause to De-
partment 4, where it had been from its inception, was an 
improper channeling to a particular judge as an individual 
rather than as the judge of the presiding criminal department. 
For the reasons above stated, the provisions by which the 
individual judge purported to retain jurisdiction of the cause 
are stricken from the orders granting probation. In all other 
respects such orders, and the judgments and order denying 
a new trial, are affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
This case demonstrates, more than any other which has 
come under my observation, the abuse of our conspiracy stat-
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ute. 'While the statute has a salutary objective, it may become 
a weapon in the hands of an overzealous prosecutor to make 
felonies out of mere misdemeanors and thus inflict great in-
justice upon people who are entirely innocent of any crime, 
but who may have had some connection or association with a 
person who has committed a misdemeanor. Under the holding 
of the majority in this case, it would be possible to obtain a 
felony eouvietion against all five occupants of an automobile 
for illegal parking, a misdemeanor, for whieh the driver of the 
ear was entirely responsible. Take the ease where a eity 
ordinanee prohibits parking within 10 feet of a fire plug-a 
car with five persons in it parks within the restricted zone. A 
poliee offieer arrests all five occupants on the theory that the 
illegal parking was the result of an agreement between them-
conspiraey to violate the parking ordinance. Under the ma-
jority holding here, the mere presence of the five in the auto-
mobile would give rise to a permissible inference of conspiraey 
to violate the parking ordinance and all five could be prose-
cuted and convicted of conspiracy which is a felony under 
section 182 of the Penal Code (People v. JJialotte, 46 CaL2d 
59 [292 P.2d 517]) and all five could be sentenced to a state 
prison even in the face of their uncontradicted testimony that 
none of them except the driver had anything to do or say 
about the parking of the car. Sueh an outrageous travesty 
would be no greater than the proseeution, verdicts, judgments, 
sentences and affirmance of the judgments in this case. The 
foregoing statement is based upon the undeniable faet that 
there is not oue word of testimony or any evidence in the 
record in this ease of any agreement or understanding be-
tween any of the defendants that any crime would be eom-
mitted by any defendant or that any eonspiracy existed be-
tween them to violate any law, and there is no basis whatever 
for an inference that sueh a conspiraey existed. 
The majority has quoted extensively from the testimony of 
some of the witnesses, but in all of this testimony there is not 
even a suggestion that there was an agreement or understand-
ing between the defendants that any of them would commit 
a crime or that there was a plan, design or scheme to violate 
any law in any respeet whatsoever, and the majority opinion 
does not refer to any evidenee iu the reeord which even 
remotely gives rise to an inference that a conspiraey existed 
between the defendants to violate a law. 
'!.'rue, a misdemeanor may have been committed by one or 
more of the defendants, but it requires something more than 
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legal reasoning or judicial interpretation to find evidence of 
a conspiracy between the defendants that any defendant 
should engage in the commission of an unlawful act. 
The record shows that a jurisdictional dispute existed in 
San Diego County between the local butchers' union and the 
local retail clerks' union. The butchers' union was of the 
opinion that its members should handle certain merchandise 
such as frozen TV dinners rather than members of the clerks' 
union. Defendant Osslo was secretary-treasurer of the butch-
ers' local, McFaden and Meyer were business agents for the 
same union. Four of the other five defendants were members 
of the Sailors Union of the Pacific and Cacio was a member 
of the Teamsters Union who had come from San Francisco 
to San Diego to accompany and protect the business agents 
of the butchers' local. The five defendants arrived in San 
Diego several days prior to October 22, 1955 and were in 
contact with Osslo, McPaden and Meyer; they attended a 
butchers' union meeting on October 21st. The record shows 
that these five defendants were paid weekly by the butchers. 
The altercation out of which this case arose took place in 
Ferguson's Market in Chula Vista. The facts giving rise to 
the fight in which one Maurer, a retail clerk, was struck and 
injured are hotly disputed and present a very close question. 
Defendants' major contentions are these : 
(1) That there is no evidence that they conspired to commit 
assault; 
(2) That the district attorney was guilty of prejudicial 
misconduct in numerous instances; 
( 3) That the court committed prejudicial error in the 
admission and exclusion of certain evidence; 
( 4) That the punishment imposed as to defendants Osslo, 
McFaden and Meyer is improper, excessive and unauthorized 
under the laws of the state and constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Constitution. 
The evidence, fairly stated, is as follows: 
Early in September, 1955, there had been a strike of the 
butchers at the Pood Basket Market in Pacific Beach which 
was authorized by Osslo, who was secretary-treasurer of the 
local union as well as the President of the \V estern Pederation 
of Butchers, and the executive board. This strike arose over 
some 23 disputed items containing meat which were handled 
in the grocery department. After the strike in which about 
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20 persons were involved, the market brought an action for an 
injunction, and after the hearing, the items were taken off 
sale. On October 13, 1953, there was a retail clerks' strike at 
Ferguson's Market and there were pickets carrying signs. 
Outside the market, there were about 25 persons including 
business agents for the clerks and butchers, as well as some 
butchers employed elsewhere. Defendants Osslo, MeFaden 
and Meyer claim that they were threatened at this time by 
members of the clerks' union and that as a result Harry 
Lundeberg of the Sailors Union of the Pacific was contacted 
and requested to send some men to accompany them during 
their rounds of checking contracts to see that they were not 
jumped from behind or injured by members of the clerks' 
union. Defendants Dimitratos and Hazel arrived in San 
Diego and reported to 1\IcFaden and on October 19th accom-
panied Jackson (butchers' union) and Meyer to Tang's 
market where they were, apparently, threatened by a member 
of the clerks' union who had a switch-blade knife and an 
outsider who had a gun. Osslo was contacted in Honolulu and 
advised Dimitratos to get some additional assistance which he 
did in the persons of Dempster, Cacio and Tucker. 
On October 22nd, Osslo, McFaden and Meyer, accompanied 
by the five other defendants, visited several markets in San 
Diego. 'I'hey arrived at Perguson 's Market at about 11 o'clock 
in the morning for the purpose of seeing one Linnville, part-
ner and manager of the market. They were told to return at 
1 o'clock. At 1 o'clock Dimitratos, Cacio, Hazel, Jackson, 
Meyer, vVoodard, Dempster, Tucker and McFaden returned 
and went into the market. McFaden, Jackson and Meyer 
stayed near the entrance talking to Linn ville; Hazel went to 
the back to talk to a young lady in the delicatessen department 
(the young lady testified that Hazel was with her at the time 
of the assault) ; Dimitratos went to the back and observed 
the meat department at the right; Tucker and Cacio, who 
had been to Tia Juana the night before and who had been 
drinking heavily, went in search of buttermilk and when they 
did not find it turned back and came across Maurer and Mont-
gomery who were representatives of the Clerks from outside 
San Diego. Defendants claim that as Dempster walked past 
them, followed by Tucker and Cacio, Maurer put his foot 
out; that Dempster saw it and stepped over it, but that Tuck-
er, thinking Maurer was trying to trip him, stepped on 
Maurer's foot; that Maurer struck at Tucker and missed and 
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hit Caeio; that Uado struek baek at whieh time Mann'r 
grabbed Caeio by the testides and lifted him off the ground; 
that 'l'ueker and CaC'io then struck Maurer nntil he dropped 
Cacio and Maurer went down; that Cacio and Tucker thought 
Maurer was reaching for a gnu and 'l'ucker kicked him until 
he was knocked out. Dempster came back and caught Caeio 
who was in great pain. Montgomery had disappeared at the 
first sign of trouble. 
Dempster took Cacio whose trousers were torn and who was 
in pain to one of the two cars. He then asked McFaden for 
the keys and Dimitratos, Hazel, Cacio and Dempster then 
drove off looking for the Ace Motel where they were staying. 
They lost their way and \Yere picked up by the police who 
found that Cacio and 'l'ueker had been drinking and noted 
Cacio 's condition and that of 'l'ueker 's hands. Maurer arrived 
at the police station that afternoon and identified them. 
A bakery clerk at the market said that Tucker, Cacio and 
Dempster were the ones responsible for the beating. Maurer's 
testimony implicated Dimitratos in the fight; and showed that 
he thought he had hit Cacio in the stomach; that up until the 
time he was called a foul name and had been hit he did noth-
ing at all to provoke a fight; that he and Montgomery had 
been trying to leave the store when they were ''surrounded'' 
by men. An organizer for the Clerks testified that Dempster 
was also in the fight; that Dimitratos and Hazel attempted to 
''get'' Montgomery by chasing him. 
The record contains testimony from both members of the 
clerks' and butchers' unions who were working iu the market. 
A member of the Butchers testified that Maurer was "looking 
for trouble" on the day in question. The Clerks, on the other 
hand, testified that Maurer was just standing and minding 
his own business. It is obvious from the record that the testi-
mony from both sides of the c-ontroversy was diametrically 
opposed. 
The police officers testified that they had been alerted by 
radio from the Chula Vista police department; that when they 
stopped the car, Cacio, Dempster, Dimitratos and Tucker got 
out; that Cacio and 'l'ucker said that "someone" had been 
reaching for a gun; that Tucker's hand was red and swollen; 
that Cacio's trouser leg was torn in two places at the thigh 
and that the men had been drinking. Dempster stated to the 
police that he had come from San Francisco on a vacation 
with his friends Tucker and Cacio; that he knew Dimitr-atos 
was in San Diego; that he did not know anything about a 
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fight; that he knew nothing about a dispute between the 
Butchers and Clerks; that he had not attended a union meet-
and that he had nothing to do with the butchers' union. 
Tucker stated that he had come to San Diego with Cacio to 
do some drinking and visit Tia Juana; that he had not come 
with Dempster; that he had nothing to say about going to 
Ferguson's Market; that he had attended a union meeting; 
that he had heard about the jurisdictional dispute between 
the Butchers and Clerks. He denied any connection with the 
butchers' union; he denied that the butchers' union had hired 
him to come to San Diego. Dimitratos told the officers he had 
come to San Diego with Hazel for a vacation; that they were 
staying at the Grant Hotel; that he had spent time with his 
friend McFaden; that he had not, nor had his friends, been 
involved in the fight at Ferguson's Market. Cacio denied 
being employed by the butchers' union; or that he had any 
interest in, or knowledge of, the dispute between the Butchers 
and the Clerks. Hazel's answers to police questions were also 
confusing and inconsistent. Meyer denied being at Ferguson's 
Market on the day of the fight. 
The People allege the following overt acts with respect to 
the conspiracy to commit assault count: 
(1) That Osslo had a conversation with Harry Lundeberg, 
on or about October 13, 1955, in San Diego; 
(2) That Dimitratos and Hazel met in San Diego on or 
about October 15, 1955; 
(3) 'fhat Mc:B'aden, at Osslo's request, made reservations 
for three rooms at the U. S. Grant Hotel in San Diego on or 
about October 14, 1955; 
(4) That McFaden, Dimitratos and Hazel met at the U.S. 
Grant Hotel on or about October 15, 1955; 
(5) That Dimitratos and Hazel met at Butchers' Local 229, 
227 E. Street, San Diego, on or about October 17, 1955; 
( 6) That Dimitratos, Hazel and Meyer, and other repre-
sentatives of butchers' local met at Tang's Market, 4508 Cass 
Street, San Diego on or about October 18, 1955; 
(7) That Dempster, Caeio and 'l'ucker met in San Diego, 
on or about October 21, 1955; 
(8) 'fhat Dempster, Cacio, Tucker, Dimitratos and Hazel 
met at the Aee Motel, San Diego, on or about October 21, 1955; 
(!J) Tl1at DPmpster, Caeio, 'l'ucker, Dimitratos and Hazel 
aeeompanied .M.d<'aden and Meyer to Ferguson's Market in 
Chula Vista on or about Oetober 22, 1955; 
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(10) That DempRter, Cacio, Tucker, Dimitratofl and Hazel 
were in a certain F'ord sedan leased by butchers' local in San 
Diego on October 22nd ; 
(11) That Osslo and/or McF'aden agreed to pay Dimitratos 
his expenses and a weekly salary on or about October 15, 
1955; 
(12) (18) (14) (15) That there was a similar agreement 
with Hazel, 'I'ucker, Dempster and Cacio. 
The People argue that from the above alleged overt acts, a 
jury could reasonably infer that a conspiracy to commit 
assault existed between the defendants; that the jury could 
reasonably determine that Osslo, with the knowledge and ap-
proval of McFaden and Meyer procured the services of the 
five sailor defendants for the purpose of intimidating the 
Clerks" by their appearance and that if this was not sufficient, 
of perpetrating an assmtlt upon a clerk who shmdd happen 
into their proximity." 
There is evidence in the record which tends to prove all of 
the alleged overt acts. As I read the record, however, there is 
no evidence (and the People point to none) that the fight was 
planned, or premeditated, or that any of the proved overt 
acts lead to that conclusion. Assuming that Cacio provoked 
the altercation and that Maurer did not (although the evi-
dence is extremely close on that point) telephone calls between 
the defendants, payment of expenses, salaries, and the making 
of hotel reservations, do not lead to the conclusion that the 
defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to commit an as-
sault. The People argue, by quoting from the remarks made 
by the trial court, that because the five defendants were 
furnished bail, counsel, and their salaries were paid after the 
assault, that the asRault had been planned between all de-
fendants prior to its commission. In People v. Will1"ams, 80 
Cal.App.2d 284 [85 P.2d 974], relied on by the People, there 
was direct evidence that a conspiracy existed to commit as-
sault. The same is also true of the case of People v. Dail, 22 
Cal.2d 642 [140 P.2cl828], relied upon by the People. It is my 
conclusion that the alleged and proved overt acts charged 
against these defendants do not support the judgment convict-
ing them of eonspiracy to commit assault. 
MISCONDUCT Ol<' DrsTHICT ATTORNEY 
It is the defendants' contention that the distril't attorney 
engaged in a course of prejudieial misconduct during the 
course of the ttoir dire examination of prospective jurors, 
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the course of the trial, and during the arguments 
jnry. Defendants cite numerous examples of miscon-
among whieh are the following: 
On voir dire examiuation, prospective jurors ·were asked 
whether they felt that ''any scgrmmt of our society should be 
irnmune from the law" or "should take the law unto them-
'' and whether they felt that because a person '.Vas a 
'' memlwr of a labor union, [he] deserves to get beat up once 
awhile"; \vhether the sustaining of an objection) 
the prospedive juror felt that "might makes right"; whether 
bceause the Clerl\s and Butehers had settled their difficulties 
it would eause the prospective juror to adopt a "let's forget 
it" attitude; ·whether the prospective juror felt that "the 
eommunity might have some interest in the matter"; whether 
the prospective juror had read "Vietor Riesel's column 'In-
side l;abor' "; \Yhether any of the people in the jnry box had 
read the eolumn; whether the prospeetive juror realized that 
every time the district attorney introdu~cd a "bit of evidenee 
in this case that in some way or other I am going to be preju-
dicing these defendant::; in your eyes''; that the juror realized 
''don't you, that we arc not up here in a criminal department 
to elect Mr. San Diego"; that "if in the course of this trial 
and as you examine the faets surrounding the beating of the 
elerk in Chula Vista, if you become aroused, and as a public 
citizen as to what happened, will you try and remove that 
from your mind and just try the case on the evidence and the 
Court's instructions and use that to arrive at your eonclu-
sion"; whether the prospective juror had heard that Mr. 
Osslo was a member of the grand jury that indieted him. (An 
objection was sustained to the last question.) It should be 
here noted that defense counsel objected throughout the course 
of the questioning that the questions were argumentative; that 
the district attorne.v waR attempting to prejudiee the jury; 
that the questions were irrelevant and immaterial; that the 
questions were for the purpose of inflaming the minds of 
tlie jurors. 
During the opeuing statement, the district attoruey again 
referred to the' fac:t that os~lo had been a member of the grand 
jury that imlieted him and defense counsel's objcetion was 
oyerruled. 'l'he distriet attorney then stated that the evidence 
would ,;how that "in the middle of October, 1955, another 
person was worried about Osslo and worried about goons.'' 
\Vhen defc'nse eounsel asked what the last word was, the 
district attorney replied: ''Goons, Another man was worried 
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about Osslo and about goons. G-o-o-n-s (spelling). That man 
is Mr. Herb De Motte. He is a Secretary-Treasurer of a 
Butchers Local in Wilmington.'' Defense counsel's objection 
was overruled and the district attorney then made a long 
and involved statement concerning the internal affairs of the 
butchers' union and the difficulties between De Motte and 
Osslo; that De Motte was afraid of ''goons. He was afraid to 
hold meetings." The district attorney's statement was obvi-
ously an attempt to show that Osslo was a man to be feared 
because he would set "goons" upon any person with whom he 
disagreed. Defense counsel's objections were overruled and 
the district attorney told the jury that De Motte would testify 
as to his fear of ''goons.'' The defendants were constantly 
referred to as ''goons.'' 
Prior to the taking of testimony, the trial court inad-
vertently started to instruct the jury concerning assault with 
a deadly weapon. \Vhen defense counsel objected that no use 
of a weapon had been charged and that the evidence would 
show that no weapon had been employed, the district attorney 
asked his co-counsel in the hearing of the jury: ''A prize 
fighter is a weapon?'' Also assigned as misconduct is the fact 
that before the court had ruled on the matter, and during a 
conference in chambers concerning the admissibility thereof, 
a board containing photographs of all the defendants, some 
of which were taken on the day they were arrested, was so 
carried and placed in the courtroom that it was visible to 
the jury. 
During the course of the trial, a witness was asked if he 
knew that Harry Lundeberg supplied "strong arm men in 
the labor movement." When an objection was sustained, the 
district attorney again asked if the witness knew whether or 
not on any prior occasion Lundeberg sent strong arm men 
into jurisdictional disputes or disputes with management. 
When a witness referred to Cacio as the ''second gentleman 
there ... " the district attorney said, "I object to the use 
of the word 'gentleman.' " The district attorney also man-
aged to get in evidence the general strike in Oakland in 1948, 
or 1949, the Wall Street strike in 1948, the Western Union 
strike in 1952, the United Financial Employees strike in 
1948, in an attempt to show that Harry Lundeberg furnished 
''strong-arm'' men from the Sailors of the Pacific to aid in 
the strikes. To all of this evidence, defense counsel's objec-
tions were ovet-ruled. The distriet attorney in his questioning 
referred to sending two sailors out to "bird dog Anderson" 
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and to sending two sailors out ''to finger Anderson.'' When 
Captain Roland, a police officer, testified that he "didn't like 
a couple of big, husky men walking around as bodyguards and 
[that they] gave the appearance of being toughs of the worst 
sort. I didn't like it, but it wasn't their physical appearance, 
other than they were big and husky,'' the district attorney 
asked him ''As a matter of fact, if you hadn't seen them in 
Osslo 's office you would have run them out of town~'' In 
questioning the defendant Dimitratos, the district attorney 
asked: ''As a matter of fact, any time Lunde berg gets in any 
type of dispute that he is out for a jurisdictional grab it is 
the old Communist slogan he uses. . . . '' 
During closing argument to the jury, the district attorney 
stated "Incidentally, let me say this: a man died in the gas 
chamber not too long ago for just this type of conduct. He 
beat a woman in the face and when she fell he kicked and 
killed her and he died for that.'' He also stated: '' Inci-
dentally, while mentioning him, let me say this: one or more 
of the jurors may say, 'Well, that Jackson was in this thing 
and he was at the scene and he did as much as some of the 
other people. Why isn't Jackson indicted? Why isn't Lunde-
berg indicted f' Those are unindicted coconspirators. That 
shouldn't concern you here. In other words. . . . '' After 
objection, the court stated that the district attorney's "re-
marks weren't directly in conformity with the Indictment. 
The indictment does not name them as unindicted co-con-
spirators, but if he feels under the evidence they are co-
conspirators he may so state.'' After other objections, the 
court again stated that if the district attorney felt that "some 
of his witnesses were co-conspirators he may so tell the jury, 
if he bases it on the evidence.'' The district attorney also 
told the jury "You hear about the great man, Harry Lunde-
berg, that is clearing the waterfront of Communists. Let me 
say this : Harry Lundeberg, Barney Mayes and Harry Bridges 
were all bed fellows at one time .... " After being told by 
the court to proceed with his argument, the district attorney 
said : ''The water tenders, the firemen and what have you is 
an independent union and Lundeberg, in his grab for power, 
has used that old slogan to grab these unions, so that is 
malarky when they try to inject Communism in this case. 
It has been something Lundeberg used to control the docks. 
It is two percent his fight against Communism and ninety 
eight per cent his grab for jurisdictional power. That is what 
it amounts to. So don't let them get you off base on this 
116 PEOPLE v. OssLo [50 C.2d 
big man who, as I said, was a brei fellow of Harry Bridges 
back in the thirties. Bridges sponsored him to he head of 
the Maritime Federation of the Paeific." After the court 
told the district attorney to confine himself to the evidence, 
he said: ''So that fellow Lunde berg, don't get auy miscon-
ception about him. 'l'hat fellow Lundeberg, where were the 
Communists on \Vall Street when they had five hundred 
men--
'' 'fhe Court: Mr. 0 'Laughlin, I kept that out of evidence. 
"Mr. O'Laughlin: \Vell, where were the Communists in 
the Western Union strike? \Vhen old Thompson got beat up 
because he happened to cross a picket line? None of that at 
all. Lundeberg-and the reason vYe were bringing it in, 
counsel says what has \Vall Street to do with it and the 
general strike in Oakland, or what has the \Vestern Union 
strike to do with it. It shows a pattern that IJ1mdeberg sup-
plies the noise and the muscle. He can swing a jurisdictional 
dispute; he can swing an election. You and I might be mem-
bers of a union and be sore at the particular administration 
and we might want it out for one reason or another, but if 
the pack that is in brings down the muscle, brings down 
some of Lundeberg's boys, we are going to be silenced because 
we are going to be afraid of our lives, afraid to open our 
mouths, bec-ause if we do ~we might get the treatment JYiaurer 
and Thompson got.'' vYhen this was objected to by defense 
counsel as unsupported by the evidenee and as improper and 
inflammatory, the court merely told the district attorney to 
''Proceed.'' 
While numerous additional instances of the same type of 
conduct could be cited, it appears that the above is sufficient 
to show that the district attorney was guilty of prejudicial 
misconduct insofar as all of these defendants are concerned. 
As we said in People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d G42, G50 [140 P.2d 
828], "It is also true, however, that in a elose case where 
the evidence is sharply conflicting, substantial and serious 
errors vital to defendant that may have resulted in a mis-
carriage of justice must be regarded as prejudicial and 
grounds for reversal. (People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723 
[108 P.2d 4].)" In the case at bar, the district attorney 
managed to interject much immaterial and irrelevant matter 
concerning strikes, the use of pickets, and assaults in other 
strikes which could not have had any other effect than to 
prejudice these defendants who were not claimed to have taken 
part therein. :Further, the numerous references to the defend-
Mar. 1958] PEOPLE v. OssLo 
[50 C.2d 75; 323 P.2d 397] 
117 
ants as "goons," "strongarm" men, "muscle" men, and the 
objections to the term "gentleman" as applied to one of the 
defendants were highly inflammatory and prejudicial, as were 
the district attorney's references to Lunde berg as a former 
Communist. From the district attorney's comments, argu-
ments and questions, it apprars that the entire labor move-
ment was on trial and that anyone connected therewith was 
suspect as a participant in the trial of this particular case. 
Such conduct is reprehensible and should not be condoned. 
In People v. Lyons, 47 CaL2d 311, 318 [303 P.2d 329], we 
said, quoting from Vier-eck v. United Slates, 318 U.S. 236, 
248 [63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734]:" 'The United States Attor-
ney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a con-
troversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern im-
partially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; 
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, bnt that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant 
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnest-
ness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. 
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.' '' Here, as 
in People v. Teixeir-a, 136 CaLApp.2d 136 [288 P.2d 535], 
''. . . it is hard to believe that this experienced prosecutor 
asked them [questions] in good faith and for any purpose 
other than to degrade defendants." In People v. Vienne, 142 
Cal.App.2d 172 [297 P.2d 1027], it was held that the district 
attorney is bound to refrain from making inflammatory state-
ments (see also People v. Wakes, 44 Cal.2d 679 [284 P.2d 
) ; in People v. Henderson, 144 Cal.App.2d 706 [301 P.2d 
468] (where the same district attorney was involved), it was 
held prejudicial and reversible error for the prosecutor to 
state or imply the existence of facts concerning which no 
evidence had been introduced. 
ADMISSioN· AND ExcLUSION OF EviDENCE 
It is first claimed by the defendants that the court erred 
in' admittiug the testimony of Captain Hodson. 'fhis testi-
mony ineluded the admission in evidenee of part of the log 
book of the steamship l.Juckenbaeh concerning a fight in 1952 
in whieh defendants Dimitratos and Dempster were involved. 
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Defendants contend, and their counsel argued at the time 
the evidence was admitted that the evidence was immaterial, 
irrelevant, too remote from the San Diego incident, and that 
it was prejudicial error for the prosecution in the first instance 
to put in evidence the bad character of the defendants. The 
trial court also permitted the People to put in evidence 
testimony that defendant Dimitratm; had been stabbed in a 
fight on board ship in 1.951; and that Dempster and Hazel 
were in the same crew. In People v. Teixeira, 136 Cal.App. 
2d 136, 148 [288 P.2d 535], People v. Adams, 76 Cal.App. 178 
[244 P. 106], People v. Nunley, 142 Cal. 441 [76 P. 45], it was 
held that such evidenee was inadmissible as an attack on the 
character of the defendant by the prosecution and constituted 
prejudicial error. In People v. Lyons, 47 Cal.2d 311, 317 [303 
P.2d 329], where the prosecution alluded on the cross-exami-
nation of the defendant's wife to a prior conviction of defend-
ant, we said: "It would be an impeaehment of the legal learn-
ing of counsel for the People to intimate that he did not know 
the aforesaid questions to be improzJet·, wholly unjustifiable 
and peculiarly calculated to prejudice the appellant before 
the jury." (Emphasis added.) (See also People v. Hardy, 
33 Cal.2d 52, 61 [198 P.2d 865] ; People v. McKelvey, 85 Cal. 
App. 769, 771 [260 P. 397].) 
The above evidence was held admissible by the trial court 
on the theory that a conspiracy had been charged even though 
the People did not contend that the conspiracy had dated 
back to 1951 and 1952. Defense counsel's motion to strike 
was denied by the trial court. From the trial court's remarks, 
it is obvious that the evidence was held admissible on the 
theory that a conspiracy presently existed between all de-
fendants. 
The evidence was inadmissible on any theory and its preju-
dicial effect is at once apparent. 
The admission of evidence concerning the Wall Street 
strike, the general strike in Oakland and the \Vestern Union 
strike has heretofore been commented upon in the discussion 
concerning the prejudicial misconduct of the district attorney. 
The trial court's statement that ''The reason I let this testi-
mony in was to show other instances where the members of the 
Sailors Union were used and what transpired, to show the 
demeanor of the sailors used on the picket lines. In this 
conspiracy count you are entitled to know all the surrounding 
circumstances of the people that were employed in the inei-
dent down here, if one happened,'' and the court's later ad-
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mission that there was an entirely different group of sailors 
in San Diego, clearly show the error that was committed. 
The case at bar involved an assault and a conspiracy to commit 
an assault and the fact that other sailors were used in picket 
lines in other areas remote in place and time is completely 
immaterial and irrelevant and was highly prejudicial to the 
defendants in the case at bar. (People v. Lyons, 47 Cal.2d 311 
[303 P.2d 329] ; People v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d 52, 61-62 [198 
P.2d 865]; People v. Wynn, 44 Cal.A.pp.2d 723, 732-733 [112 
P.2d 979] ; People v. Freitas, 34 Cal.App.2d 684, 687 (94 P.2d 
397]; People v. Stafford, 108 Cal.App. 26, 29-31 [290 P. 920] .) 
Defendants contend that the court erred in excluding testi-
mony offered by them to show that threats had been made 
against some of them which :necessitated the request to Lunde-
berg for bodyguards to accompany the Butchers' business 
agents on their rounds. Inasmuch as the evidence is in sharp 
conflict as to which side started the :fight, this testimony 
should have been admitted. If threats had been shown to have 
been made against the business agents of the Butchers by 
members of the clerks' union, the evidence would be admissible 
as tending to prove the defense theory that the five defendants 
were summoned to San Diego to act as bodyguards only and 
to disprove the People's theory that a conspiracy to commit 
assault existed between all eight of the defendants. 
PUNISHMENT OF 0SSLO, :McF ADEN AND MEYER AS IMPROPER, 
ExcESSIVE AND UNLAWFUL 
Osslo and McFaden were each :fined $1,500 to be paid from 
their own funds; Meyer was :fined $750 to be paid from his 
own funds. 
Osslo and McFaden were ordered to serve six months in the 
county jail; Meyer was ordered to serve three months in the 
connty jail. 
These three defendants were placed on 10 years' probation, 
during which time they could hold no union office and receive 
no salary for any union services, or participate in any union 
negotiations. In addition, these defendants were required to 
fill out an annual affidavit that the :fine payments were made 
from their own funds and that they held no union office, etc., 
and "further, that this Court and Judge shall retain juris-
diction of this matter throughout the said period of probation 
and no other department of the Court or other Judge shall 
modify this order without notice to the Judge who tried the 
case . ... " 
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Defendants argue that the terms of their probation eut off 
their ability to earn a livelihood ; that said terms violate 
the principle back of probation which "is defined as an act of 
grace and clemency, which may be granted by the court to a 
seemingly deserving defendant, whereby he may escape the 
extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of 
whieh he stands convicted." (People v. Hainline, 219 Cal. 
532, 534 [28 P.2d 16] ; Lee v. Superior Coz~rt, 89 Cal.App.2d 
716, 717 [201 P .2d 882]) and that it violates the principle that 
the terms and conditions of probation must be reasonable 
under all the circumstances (In re Trombley, 31 Cal.2d 801, 
811 [193 P.2d 734] ). 
\Vhile these three defendants were found guilty of both 
conspiracy to eommit assault, and assault with force likely 
to produce great bodily harm, it is apparent from the record 
that they were not involved in the actual assault. Defendants 
claim, with merit, that it is impossible to determine whether 
they were convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor since they 
were charged with and found guilty of conspiracy to commit 
assault and charged with, and found gnilty of, assault with 
force likely to produce great bodily injnry. 
Defendants' arguments in this respect have merit. It ap-
pears that the terms of probation are such as would deprive 
defendants of their means of livelihood and also violate the 
principles of probation. The purpose of probation is not to 
impose penalties (In re Ilays, 120 Cal.App.2d 308, 310 [260 
P.2d 1030] ; In re Martin, 82 Cal.App.2d 16, 22 [185 P.2d 
645]). It is my opinion that the trial court was guilty 
of an abuse of discretion with respect to the terms and condi-
tions of probation imposed on defendants Osslo, McFaden 
and Meyer. 
ERRORS IN THE MAJORITY OPINION 
THE EVIDENCE : 
I have heretofore set forth a fair statement of the evidence 
as it relates to the case at bar. We are here concerned with 
evidence to support a judgment of conviction of conspiracy to 
commit assault. There is no doubt that an assault was com-
mitted by some of the defendants. Defendants Osslo, Mc-
Faden and Meyer were not involved in the actual assault and 
the People do not so argue. The majority opinion quotes 
at length from the testimony of one Jackson, a business agent 
for the Butchers. Nothing said by the witness, or quoted in 
the majority opinion, leads to the conclusion that these defend-
ants were engaged in a conspiracy to commit assault. The 
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majority makes much of the statements of the witness that 
the police force was not called for protection rather than 
members of the sailors' union, that older, unemployed mem-
bers of the butchers' union of San Diego were not called 
upon to act as observers and that members of other San Diego 
labor unions were not called upon. The witness' testimony 
regarding his belief that members of the Butchers had reason 
to fear violence from the Clerks is quoted extensively in an 
endeavor by the majority to show that no such fear could 
reasonably have existed. In the first instance there is no 
law that I am aware of which would require these defendants 
to ask police protection or to hire any particular segment of 
society to act as their observers. I also know of no law 
prohibiting the hiring of a bodyguard for protection. It also 
appears to me highly unlikely that any police force would 
have sufficient men available to accompany members of labor 
unions on their rounds in order to prevent trouble which at 
that time was only a possibility. Insofar as the fear of trouble 
was concerned and any threats, by conduct, or otherwise, made 
by members of the Clerks to members of the Butchers were 
concerned it appears to me that fear is subjective and that 
these men, who were there at the time, were far more able 
to recognize it than the members of the majority of this court 
who only know what appears in the record as we see it tod~;ty. 
Because defendant Osslo said he was "top man" on the 
west coast and ''that was it'' and because he said the Butchers 
would ''show'' the Clerks, the majority infers that Osslo ''set 
up a situation which inferentially was designed to, and which 
clearly did, increase the likelihood of violence iu the juris-
dictional dispute. On a view of the evidence favorable to the 
prosecution, which the law at this stage of the proceeding 
requires of us, it is fairly inferrible that Osslo, McFaden, and 
1\feyer at least tacitly understood, anticipated that the remain-
five defendants wonld not merely be present to act as 
'observers' and protect the Butchers from violence, bnt would 
and should initiate the violence, which they subsequently did 
initiate, to 'show' the Clerks that Osslo indeed 'was boss of 
the West Coast and he would fight for jurisdiction' and 'that 
was it.' " No such inferences ean be fairly drawn from tlte 
recor·d. It should be borne in mind that the conspiracy 
charged here was to commit assault-not a conspiracy to make 
Osslo "boss" of the west coast! There is absolutely nothing 
in the record from which an inference may be drawn that 
Osslo intended the five defendants to "initiate" violence and 
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in the state of this reeord with its numerous instances of 
prejudicial misconduct and the close question of fact pre-
sented concerning just which labor union instigated the alter-
cation, this eourt should not concern itself with drawing such 
an inference. Because other members of the sailors' union 
had partieipated in other labor union disputes in other parts 
of the eountry in 1948, 1949 and 1952, and had, according to 
the rna.iority, been guilty of assault and battery in conneetion 
therewith, we are told that we may infer that Osslo, McFaden 
and Meyer knew that thE'se defendants would initiate violence. 
So far as this record is coneerned we do not know whether 
or not the members of the sailors' union engaged in those 
other strikes were the guilty ones in the crime of assault and 
battery. Por all we know, the other parties involwd may have 
been the guilty ones and the sailors' members eompletely 
innocent. Even if the members of the Railors' union involved 
in those other strikes were the guilty ones, Rhould every mem-
ber of a labor union to which he must belong if he is to earn 
his livelihood be held guilty of the same crime 1 'fhe question 
answers itself and shows the fallacy in the reasoning of the 
majority. That reasoning carries the philosophy of ''guilt 
by association" to its ultimate extreme. 
ADMISSION AND REJECTION OF EviDENCE: 
The majority feels that the admission of evidence concern-
ing other and remote labor disputes in which other members 
of the sailors' union were involved was not prej ndicial error 
when eonRidered in the "light of other circumstances, includ-
ing the prior activities of Osslo, MeFaden and Meyer" to 
show that these men "contemplated that the employment of 
the sailor defendants probably would result in acts of vio-
lence by" the other five defendants. First we are told to 
rely on the asserted violent tendencies of other members of 
the sailors' union to show that Osslo, MeFaden and Meyer 
are guilty as charged and, secondly, that "the prior [ unex-
plained] activities" of the three men made such evidence 
admissible because it showed their knowledge that violence 
would result. There is absolutely nothing in the record to 
show any connection between the other strikes in which other 
members of the sailors' union participated and any of these 
defendants except that some of them belonged to the sailors' 
un10n. 
The majority finds that the jury could not have been misled 
because of the admission of evidence of fights, uneonneoted 
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with labor whieh tweurred in 1951 and 1952, and 
whieh oceurrerl on board ships on which Dimitratos and 
Dempster were sailors. It is said that "in light of the cir-
cumstances :surrounding their importation and employment, 
it does not appt>ar that the jury could have been misled by 
evidence that they had been involved in other altercations." 
'l'he only reason for the admission of such evidence would be 
to show the allegedly bad character of these two defendants 
and was wholly inadmissible as I have heretofore pointed out 
and such evidence has, up until this case, been held to consti-
tute an unwarranted attack on the character of a defendant 
and to constitute prejudicial error. The question is not one 
of misleading the jnry but goes to the question of due process 
in that every person aecused of a erime is entitled to a fair 
trial on the merits of his particular ease. 
Coneerning the admission of evidenee of telephone calls 
between the defendants and other members of their organi-
zations of whieh the defendants eomplain, the majority says 
'"rhis evidence was properly reeeived to show defendants' 
association; that that association was criminal is shown by 
the other e.-vidence, viewed as a whole." This statement as-
sumes the answer to the main question involved-whether 
defendants conspi1·ed to eommit the assault and battery which 
oecurred. lVIere association and telephone calls, the subject 
matter of whieh is completely unknown, have never, until now 
been sufficient to show that a conspiraey to commit a crime 
existed. Under the holding here, no assoeiation, no telephone 
eall, ean be innocent and immune from a later charge of 
eonspiracy if one of the parties should later be aeeused of a 
crime of any type. 
With respeet to the admission of evidence of the arrest of 
two members of the elerks' union after the assault and battery 
involved here oceurred, and of which defendants eomplain, 
the majority says that ''This testimony tends to show that 
defendant Osslo, after the assault, attempted to harass the 
Ulerks by unsubstantiated aecusations and to distract em-
phasis from the charges against him by countereharges; it 
was thus admissible as tending to show that Osslo was a 
conspirator carrying on an effort to make good his declaration 
that he 'was boss of the West Coast and he would fight for 
jurisdiction,' and not, as he argues, the innoeent employer of 
persons who were to aetas 'observers' or at the most to show 
the Clerks that the Butchers were proteeted, without the 
exercise of force.'' The conspiracy charged here was that 
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of assault and battery, not the promotion of (};;slo as "boss" 
of the west coast. 'rhe assault and battery had occurred 
before the arrrst of the clerks and heneP the eonspiracy, if 
any, had been tPrminated. To be admissible, the aet or decla-
ration must have been made during the pendency and prior 
to the termination of the enterprise and in f1trtherance of 
the common design (People v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345; Estate of 
Strachan, 166 Cal. 162 [135 P. 296] ; B1t.cld v. Morgan, 187 
Cal. 741 [203 P. 7fi4J ; People v. Perlin, 203 Cal. 587 [265 
P. 230]; People v. Smith, 151 Cal. 619 [91 P. 511]; People v. 
Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731 [104 P.2d 794]; People v. Steccone, 
36 Cal.2d 234 [223 P.2d 17 J). 
'l'he majority holds that the exclusion of evidence concern-
ing lVIcFaden 's report to Jackson and Osslo that he had been 
frightened by the Clerks could not, in the "light of the 
record'' have prejudiced defendants. 'rhis evidence was 
patently admissible under the defendants' theory and should 
have been admitted. It is clearly seen that evidence damning 
to them is held properly admitted while evidence in their 
favor is held properly excluded. A fair trial encompasses 
all the relevant and material admissible evidence whether 
favorable, or unfavorable, to either side. A fair trial does 
not mean a trial where the prosecution uses every means, 
whether fair, or foul, to gain a conviction and no court should 
condone such a practice. As we said in People v. Lyons, 47 
Cal.2d 311, 317 [303 P.2d 329], it would be an impeachment 
of the legal le.arning of counsel for the People to intimate 
that he did not know that what he was doing was improper, 
wholly unjustifiable and peculiarly calculated to prejudice the 
appellant before the jury. Counsel for the People knew, or 
should have known, that his conduct and a great deal of the 
evidence produced by him was wholly irrelevant and that it 
was "peculiarly calculated to prejudice" the defendants in 
the eyes of the jury. He should also have known that evidence 
relevant to defendants' side of the case was admissible and a 
part of the entire background of the American system of 
jurisprudence -a fair trial. 
MISCONDUCT OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: 
I have heretofore set forth in detail some of the instances 
in which the district attorney was guilty of prejudicial mis-
conduct ~wd the majority has cited some additional exam-
ples all of which were calculated to and did inflame the minds 
of the jurors. 'I' he majority, however, finds that "the evi-
:Mar. 1958] PEOPLE v. OssLo 
[50 C.2d 75; 323 P.2d 3971 
125 
deuce so overwhelmingly supports the implied findings that 
it docs not appear reasonable to believe that the misconduct 
was a contributing factor" in arriving at the verdicts. As I 
have pointed out at length the evidence is far from over-
whelming-it is nonexistent so far as a conspiracy is involved 
since the overt acts, in and of themselves, while proved, 
do not lead to the inevitable conclusion that defendants con-
spired to commit assault and battery. The overt acts charged 
~onsisted of a number of conversations and meetings between 
the defendants, a labor meeting at ·which defendants were 
present, hotel reservations made for some of the defendants; 
defendants' presence in can; leased by the butchers' local of 
San Diego; salaries agreed to be paid to the five defendants 
by Osslo or McF'aden. 'fhere was no proof, either direct or 
circumstantial, of what the conversations were at either the 
meetings or at the labor meeting; there 1vas no proof either 
direct or circmnstantial that at any of the times charged, 
defendants conspired to commit assault and battery. The 
majority, however, infers that all of these meetings were used 
for an evil and unlawful purpose and concludes that the 
rvidenee against all the defendants is so "overwhelming" that 
no misconduct could have prejudiced the defendants in the 
eyes of the jury. 
It can hardly be doubted that the interjection of Commu-
nism in the ease 1vas prejudicial to the defendants as was 
the use of the words ''goon,'' ''finger man,'' ''strong-arm 
men," and "toughs." All of these things tended to attack 
the character of the defendants so as to prejudiec them in 
the minds of the jurors and from the state of the record were 
obviously calculated to do just that by the prosecutor. 
An admonition to the jury to decide the case on the evidence 
produced is insuffieient to eure the errors and misconduct 
which occurred in this case. A reading of the record shows 
that from the voiT dire examination of prospective jurors, 
throughout the trial, and until its close, the prosecution was 
guilty of a deliberate attempt to harass, embarrass, and preju-
dice these defendants. The majority finds nothing wrong 
with the trial judge permitting counsel for the People to 
"yeH" at one of the defendants while on the stand. It is 
said that the reeord does not show that the "yelling" intimi-
dated the witness. 'l'he district attorney is a representative 
of the People and as such is not "at liberty to strike foul" 
blows. Here, as in People v. Teixeira, 136 Cal.App.2d 136 
[288 P.2d 535], " it is hard to believe that this expe-
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rienced prosecutor'' yelled at a witness ''in good faith and for 
any purpose other than to degrade'' him. 
CoNDITIONS OF PROBATION : 
I have heretofore discussed these conditions and my reasons 
for feeling that they were excessive and in violation of the 
principle of probation. The majority cites People v. Frank, 
94 Cal.App.2d 740, 741-742 [211 P.2d 350], as authority for 
its holding that the punishment imposed was perfectly proper. 
In the Frank case the defendant was himself guilty of com-
mitting a crime. In the ease at bar, defendants Osslo, Me-
FadeD and Meyer were not guilty of the aetual assault and 
it is only by means of the improper use of the conspiracy 
statute that they are in any way involved. As I have pointed 
out the record shows a total lack of evidence that these 
defendants conspired with the others to commit the crime with 
which they were eharged and a majority of this court, in 
affirming the judgments of conviction and the terms of pro-
bation, has deprived these three defendants of their means 
of earning a livelihood since they may not even work as 
the most menial of laborers in their own nnion and cannot 
receive remuneration ''from any union.'' The terms of 
probation are wholly out of line with the cases holding that 
probation is an aet of graee and elemeney for the purpose of 
permitting rehabilitation of a drfendant who is "seemingly 
deserving" and for the purpose of permitting him to "eseape 
the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the 
offense of which he stands eonvieted" (People v. Hainline, 
219 Cal. 532, 534 [28 P.2d 16] ; Lee v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. 
App.2d 716, 717 [201 P.2d 882]). 
SuMMATION 
In my opinion : 
1. 'fhe judgment should be reversed with direetions to dis-
miss the charge of eonspiraey to eommit assault as to all 
defendants beeause of the total lack of evidence in the record 
to support the charge. 
2. The rceord shows that only the defendants, Cacio, Ttwker 
and possibly Dempsf er and Dirnitrat os, could have engaged 
in the assault. There is no evidence to show that it was other 
than a spontaneous assault and, in view of the sharp conflict 
in the evidenee as to the person responsible for starting the 
altercation and the prejndieial miscondmt of the district 
attorney, as vVPll as the highly prejudieial ehararter of the 
evidence erroneously admitted (as heretofore discussed), the 
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should be reversed as to tlJpm in order that they 
have a fair tr·ial on the merits. vVe held in People v. 
47 Cal.2d 811, 319 [303 P.2d 329], that "It is axiomatic 
that when an accused is denied that fair and impartial trial 
guaranteed by law, such procedure amounts to a denial of 
due process of law (Powell v. Alabama [1932], 287 U.S. 45 
S.Ct. 55, 77 I.1.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527])." 
3. Since there is no evidence which tends to connect defend-
ants Osslo, 1\IcFaden, Meyer and Hazel with the actual 
assault, the trial court should be directed to dismiss as to these 
defendants the charge of assault by means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 23, 
1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and rrraynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[ Crim. No. 6108. In Bank. .M:ar. 27, 1958.] 
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